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INTRODUCTION 
The American civil justice system serves both individual and social interests 
by adjudicating disputes and establishing a system for resolving conflicts under 
law. Court decisions—the tangible products of that system—can play both pri-
vate and public roles, telling feuding litigants who is right while offering reason-
ing available for posterity in the body of precedent. This article scrutinizes the 
public nature of precedent, inquiring which decisions remain confined to private 
parties’ knowledge and which are made available for public consumption. Most 
broadly, the investigation presented here questions what role a decision’s acces-
sibility should play in our system of precedent and how technological evolution 
can drive—and be driven by—precedent’s animating principles.  
Theory and empiricism inform the pursuit of answers to these questions. 
This article begins with empirical examination. Drawing from a sample of fed-
eral district court decisions, the study presented here focuses on “submerged 
precedent”—reasoned opinions available only on court dockets, and not on the 
Westlaw and Lexis commercial databases.  
These submerged precedents exhibit the hallmark of “precedent” in that they 
contain reasoned elaborations of the bases for a court’s decision. Submerged 
precedents often contain reasoning in greater length, depth, and intricacy than 
their visible counterparts in Westlaw or Lexis. Yet these precedents buried on 
dockets are effectively “submerged” from plain view, like the portion of an ice-
berg below the ocean’s surface. Submerged precedent, for example, encom-
passes a federal district court’s 1,240-word opinion deeply analyzing whether a 
contractual forum-selection clause may prospectively waive the right to contest 
removal jurisdiction.1 Westlaw, by contrast, includes a 525-word opinion from a 
different circuit on this topic, but does not include the more deeply-reasoned dis-
trict court opinion or direct guidance from that district’s circuit. 2 
Submerged precedent, in a practical sense, is reserved solely for those who 
know it exists, namely the parties to that case and extraordinarily intrepid re-
                                                        
1  Omnicare, Inc. v. Walgreens, No. 08-cv-03901 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2008) (reprinted in Ap-
pendix 1). 
2  Ocwen Orlando Holdings Corp. v. Harvard Property Trust, LLC, 526 F.3d 1379 (11th Cir. 
2008); cf. Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014) (7,229-word opin-
ion on enforceability of particular clause for venue dismissal). Westlaw also contains some 
other district court opinions of similar length, as well as many much shorter and more fact-
specific decisions on other topics. See, e.g., Brown v. Press Repair Eng’g Sales & Serv., Inc., 
No. 8:08-cv-1115-T-23TGW, 2008 WL 5263748 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2008) (1,133-word or-
der); see also, e.g., PGT Trucking, Inc. v. Lyman, 500 F. App’x. 202 (3d Cir. 2012) (731 
words, including discussion of appellate review); Cornus Corp. v. GEAC Enter. Sols., Inc., 
356 F. App’x 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (285 words); Spectracom, Inc. v. Tyco Int’l, Inc., 124 F. 
App’x 75 (3d Cir. 2004) (1,190-word opinion, writing “only for the parties”). 
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searchers employing grueling docket-based search techniques to find these opin-
ions. Submerged precedent’s visible counterparts in Westlaw and Lexis, by con-
trast, fulfill both private and public functions in conveying decisions for parties, 
as well as providing referents for future parties and courts.  
While the high-profile debate rages over appellate courts’ designation of 
opinions as “unpublished” and therefore non-precedential,3 the study of sub-
merged precedent presented here identifies a deeper layer of “unpublication” in 
district courts—one that not only limits public use of court opinions, but largely 
prevents public knowledge of those opinions’ existence. All reasoned appellate 
opinions are open to public view through Westlaw and Lexis, and thus are avail-
able for citation in future cases and the kind of comparison that has sparked con-
troversy. The current debate at the appellate level no longer questions public ac-
cess to unpublished opinions, but now centers on appellate courts’ prerogative to 
label those opinions prospectively as fit for future precedential use. Submerged 
precedent, by extension, identifies a mass of opinions obscured from public view, 
and therefore practically restricted from public use or even comparison.  
Numerous studies have pointed to the skewed picture of trial courts’ work-
load, management, and disposition of cases that exists from examining Westlaw 
and Lexis opinions alone, akin to navigating the iceberg from its tip.4 But sub-
merged precedent pushes docketology in an uncharted direction by identifying a 
mass of reasoned opinions—putative precedent and not mere evidence of deci-
sion-making—that exist only on dockets. Submerged precedent thus raises the 
specter that docket-based research may be necessary in some areas to ascertain 
an accurate picture of the law itself, not just trial courts’ administration of it.  
The existence of a submerged body of reasoned law carries the potential to 
destabilize our system of precedent and undermine the system’s animating prin-
ciples of fairness, efficiency, and legitimacy by obscuring decisional law. To in-
vestigate whether these threats to the precedential system from submergence 
have materialized, this article presents an analysis of a sample of opinions: re-
mand decisions from two district courts over seven years, all adjudicating fed-
eral-question removals of state-law claims. The study found that 30 percent of 
all reasoned opinions are submerged on dockets (and 44 percent of all decisions 
contain no reasoning at all). Looking purely at outcome measures (whether to 
grant or deny remand), the existence of submerged precedent distorts the picture 
of remand rates. In this sample, for example, reasoned opinions concerned with 
                                                        
3  See Plumley v. Austin, 547 U.S. __ (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing use of the 
“unpublished” label); Adam Liptak, Courts Write Decisions that Elude Long View, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/us/justice-clarence-thomas-court-
decisions-that-set-no-precedent.html [https://perma.cc/9ECS-82G9] (reporting on the debate 
over unpublished opinions). 
4  See generally William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1723 (2005) (identifying opinions published in reporter volumes as the iceberg’s 
tip and unpublished opinions as the remainder); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Stud-
ying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Dis-
crimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133 (1990) (same). 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) federal questions remanded 
the case 63.67 percent of the time. Looking only in Westlaw, the remand rate 
drops to 46.67 percent, while 100 percent of the submerged cases were re-
manded.  
Beyond just outcome measures, submerging reasoned opinions from public 
view carries the potential to skew the substantive law and permit inequitable ad-
judication. Although the small sample gathered here raises far more questions 
than it has the power to answer, several factors appear relevant to submergence: 
structure of legal tests, managerial discretion, party sophistication, and insulation 
from appeal.  
Given these observations, there may be an ideal role for submerged prece-
dent to play. As technology democratizes access to court opinions and eliminates 
traditional justifications for selective publication in bound volumes, these reflec-
tions on the balance between submergence and availability acquire even greater 
urgency. The E-Government Act of 2002 mandated online public access to fed-
eral courts’ “written opinions,”5 catalyzing the federal courts to digitize their 
dockets and build the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) da-
tabase for public access.6 BloombergLaw has added a more facile docket search 
interface for a fee, and the United States Government Printing Office has just 
branched out into free online access to court opinions through an FDSys pilot 
project. Yet the march toward unfettered public access to court decisions thus far 
has sidestepped thoughtful consideration of the interplay between technology, 
access, and precedent theory, while tacitly permitting submergence of reasoned 
opinions.  
This article responds to this unique moment in the evolution of precedent 
and the recently-rekindled national debates over precedential values. The analy-
sis proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys the existing empirical evidence about 
decision-making in district courts and describes the methods for collecting this 
data set. Part I then establishes the defining features of the submerged precedent 
identified in this data and compares the sample of district court decisions in 
Westlaw to those available only on dockets. By this comparison, the study re-
veals possible forces behind submergence and the potential for inequity and skew 
in the substantive law these opinions apply. 
Part II illustrates submerged precedent’s implications for precedent theory 
and for district courts’ role in shaping law. Part II first anchors submerged prec-
edent in precedent doctrine, explaining how submerged precedent’s defining fea-
tures reflect the doctrine’s broader systemic goals of efficiency, predictability, 
and legitimacy. Part II then theorizes the threats that submergence may pose to 
                                                        
5  E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
6  PACER stands for Public Access to Court Electronic Records. PUB. ACCESS TO CT. 
ELECTRONIC RECORDS, https://www.pacer.gov [https://perma.cc/9H3J-H4B4] (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter PACER]. The PACER database provides public access to docket 
information and documents filed in each federal district and appellate court. Id. 
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those goals and highlights the unique institutional roles that district court opin-
ions play.  
Proceeding from Part I’s empirical observations and Part II’s theoretical 
foundations, Part III outlines submerged precedent’s ideal role. In considering 
the optimal level of submergence, Part III considers technology’s democratizing 
influence on the future composition of—and interface with—a civil justice sys-
tem based in precedent. Ultimately, this project concludes that submerged prec-
edent’s existence should inform procedural and practical choices affecting the 
body of decisional law available to the public that it is intended to serve, sug-
gesting that submerged precedent’s debut here should presage its demise.  
I. DIVING FOR PRECEDENT: OPINIONS OUT OF VIEW 
The core subject of this project, “precedent,” has inspired a complex taxon-
omy7 that requires definition before discussion. This article’s eponymous new 
species of precedent, “submerged precedent,” refers to opinions available only 
on court dockets, beyond the view of conventional research.8 I begin by briefly 
defining each term in the phrase. 
I invoke here a broad definition of “precedent,” based on doctrine, rather 
than hierarchy. In this project, I use the term “precedent” to refer to any written 
decision supported by reasoned elaboration, commonly known as “opinions.”9 
Reasoned elaboration long has been considered precedent’s defining feature,10 
and supplies a decision’s potential utility in deciding future cases. This definition 
of precedent thus covers written opinions with some potential utility, but without 
regard to the authoring court’s ability to bind future courts.11 Crucially, this def-
inition includes federal district court opinions, which do not formally bind other 
                                                        
7  Hillel Levin aptly describes the multilayered categorizations of precedent as a “sophisticated 
taxonomy.” Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 
(2013); see also, e.g., Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 
1460–62 (2010) (detailing “A Lexicon of Precedent”). 
8  Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of 
Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 427 (2012). 
9  See Free Written Opinions, PACER SERV. CTR. (Oct. 2005), http://www.pacer.gov/announce 
ments/quarterly/qa200510.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU79-MG35] (promoting the Judicial Con-
ference definition for “written opinion” as any decision with accompanying “reasoned expla-
nation”); see also Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Func-
tion, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1334–35 (2008) (highlighting the role of reasoned elaboration in 
judicial legitimacy). 
10  See, e.g., K N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 158 (2d ed. 1951) (“[W]here the reason 
stops, there stops the rule.”); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 223 (11th 
ed. 1957) (“The concrete decision is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract 
ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as regards the world at large.”); see also 
Precedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An action or official decision that 
can be used as support for later actions or decisions; esp., a decided case that furnishes a basis 
for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues.”); infra Part II.A. 
11  E.g., Dobbins, supra note 7, at 1460 (defining “precedent” as “any prior decisions that 
might be deemed to have some positive utility in deciding later cases”). 
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courts.12 Still, district court opinions offer considerable utility as persuasive prec-
edents, as discussed more fully in Part II, below. This project therefore focuses 
on the reasoned opinion as putative “precedent.”  
The utility of reasoned elaborations as precedent, however, depends func-
tionally on the opinions’ accessibility for future courts and litigants. The study 
presented here found a mass of reasoned opinions available only on court dock-
ets, and not available on Westlaw, or Lexis. These putative precedents are essen-
tially submerged from public view and therefore excluded from consideration 
among the body of precedential law. I refer to them as “submerged” precedent, 
describing the decisions’ relative obscurity by alluding to the portion of an ice-
berg below the water’s surface and thus invisible to the eye.13  
With the reasoned opinion as the building block for the precedential system, 
effectively excluding some portion of those blocks from use thus carries at least 
the potential to skew or destabilize the system itself.14 To tackle some soaring 
questions about operationalizing precedent doctrine, this article begins with em-
pirical observation on the ground. The study presented here investigates which 
reasoned decisions are reserved for the parties’ consumption and which also are 
available for posterity’s use as precedent. The remainder of this Part describes 
the method used to collect and sample these submerged precedents in light of 
prior studies, and then compares the submerged precedents to those opinions 
available in Westlaw. Part II will connect these observations to precedent doc-
trine.  
A. Navigating District Court Decisions 
This project aims to contribute to empirical understanding of removal juris-
diction in the federal district courts, and ultimately to open a broader discussion 
connecting the realities of public access to precedent’s doctrinal foundations. In-
itially, this project sought to study how district courts handled federal-question 
jurisdiction remands before and after Supreme Court resolution of a circuit split, 
which poses the question of where and how to begin. The methodologies for 
studies of district courts are often far less straightforward than for appellate 
                                                        
12  Id. at 1461–63. 
13  See, e.g., Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 4 (describing formally published opinions as 
the iceberg’s tip and unpublished opinions as the iceberg’s remainder; using statistical analysis 
to reveal significant differences between published and unpublished employment discrimina-
tion opinions); see also David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 687 (2007) (acknowledging the same idea); Richman, supra note 4. 
For submerged precedents, see McCuskey, supra note 8, at 390, 427. 
14  See generally Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in 
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004). 
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courts, owing to institutional differences between the courts.15 Fortunately, stud-
ies of district courts now can build on a burgeoning wealth of empirical evidence 
about procedure and decision-making that has sharpened scholarly knowledge of 
both, as well as evolved the methods for studying them.  
Three major methodological considerations have emerged in district court 
studies. First, the study of district courts demands that research identify which of 
the courts’ numerous functions will be relevant to the inquiry—for district courts 
adjudicate merits, fact, and procedure, as well as manage, delegate, and direct.16 
It has been suggested that researchers can obtain the most accurate picture of 
district-court functioning only through docketology—inclusion of non-opinion 
data and documents like orders, settlements, pleadings, and the troves of other 
information about cases revealed from their docket sheets.17 Figuring out what 
function to study is thus an important inquiry. 
Second, research must identify what products or data points likely will yield 
information about the chosen district-court function. Even a singular focus on 
the core function of “deciding”—as in this project—belies significant heteroge-
neity in district court work. District courts decide a multitude of issues ancillary 
to a case’s merits,18 and may decide on a case’s ultimate disposition multiple 
times under a variety of standards, procedures, and predicates.19  
District courts’ decisions also take many forms including opinions, orders 
oral statements on transcripts, or even letters to the parties.20 “Written opinions,” 
defined by the Judicial Conference as all decisions accompanied by “reasoned 
elaboration,” are the decisions that offer the most public value.21 But many cases 
produce no decisions, many decisions produce no written record, and many writ-
ten decisions contain no reasoning. As workloads have increased in the past three 
decades,22 district court judges managing more cases and disputes have less time 
                                                        
15  Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making, 29 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 83, 94 (2009) (“In short, judging on the federal district courts is fundamentally 
different from appellate judging.”). 
16  See Hoffman et al., supra note 13, at 682; Kim et al., supra note 15, at 90–94. 
17  See Hoffman et al., supra note 13, at 682. 
18  Such as discovery disputes, admissibility rulings, requests for oral argument, and even 
scheduling. See Kim et al., supra note 15, at 90. 
19  Such as judgments on the pleadings under Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c), and 50(a), and judgments 
on both pleadings and evidence under Rules 56 and 50. Christina L. Boyd, Opinion Writing in 
the Federal District Courts, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 254, 258, 265 (2015). See generally Oldfather, 
supra note 9. 
20  See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL, 2–3 (1991), http://www.fjc.gov/pub 
lic/pdf.nsf/lookup/JudiWrit.pdf/$file/JudiWrit.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AWS-UVLN] (outlin-
ing considerations for federal judges on when to write a “full-dress” published opinion, a 
memorandum opinion, an unpublished opinion, or a summary order). 
21  See Free Written Opinions, supra note 9. 
22  Cf. Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal 
Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25 (1996); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On NOT Making 
Law, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 158 (1998) (investigating workload and opinion-writing 
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to devote to the discretionary task of opinion writing, which would generate po-
tential precedents, as well as useful data.23 And judges select very few of the 
opinions they do take the time to write for inclusion in the printed reporters.24  
In the study of district court decisions, then, it matters what you search for 
and where you look—the third consideration. Just focusing on the single function 
of “deciding” requires consultation of orders (available only on dockets) and 
opinions (available on dockets and mostly on commercial databases) to make 
holistic observations about outcomes.25 If you care about the bases for decisions, 
then you should consult opinions, which might be published in reporters (i.e., 
“reported” decisions)26 or might not. And these reported and unreported opinions 
are housed in various places—chiefly in the federal courts’ PACER docket data-
base and the leading commercial electronic databases, Westlaw and Lexis.  
It is well-documented that district-court opinions selected for the print re-
porter volumes (the Federal Supplement and Federal Rules Decisions) may not 
be representative of decision-making, and that therefore reliance solely on re-
ported decisions to study judicial behavior risks biased results.27 Nor do reported 
opinions represent all of the law from a doctrinal standpoint because precedential 
                                                        
in the federal appellate courts; starting from the fact that “[t]here has been a dramatic increase 
in the federal appellate caseload since the 1960s, estimated at as much as 1000%.”). 
23  See generally Boyd, supra note 19. 
24  See generally id. 
25  See, e.g., Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judg-
ments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 147 (2007) (“Thus, it seems that, for 
now, the only accurate method to determine whether summary judgment has supplanted jury 
trial as the dominant method of federal dispute resolution is to conduct docket research.”); 
McCuskey, supra note 8, at 422–23. 
26  I call them “reported” because they are in a Reporter, rather than “published,” which has a 
constantly-shifting usage. 
27  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil 
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 604 
(2004); Hoffman et al., supra note 13, at 727 (“In our view, docketology’s main contribution 
is to starkly expose how little trial court work is explained through written opinions. An aston-
ishingly low 3% of all orders are available on the databases; more than 80% of difficult orders 
are similarly ‘hidden’ without explanation.”); Lizotte, supra note 25, at 108, 146 (“[P]ublished 
opinions represent an incomplete and distorted view of actual summary-judgment activity in 
the federal trial courts;” “researchers cannot rely on Lexis and Westlaw to estimate the inci-
dence of summary-judgment practice in the federal courts.”); Peter Siegelman & John J. 
Donohue, supra note 4, at 1133 (employment discrimination cases); see also, e.g., Denise M. 
Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial 
Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 234–36 (2009) (noting that the “vast majority of 
. . . opinions remain unpublished” and advising that “future scholars should not continue to 
ignore the rich source of information available in unpublished opinions.”); Kim et al. supra 
note 15, at 86 (outlining how researchers should take “advantage of the electronic docketing 
system now operating in all federal district courts.”); Boyd, supra note 19, at 271 (explaining 
that legal and institutional constraints on decision-making become observable “once we move 
away from studying published outcomes and only highly salient cases in district courts.”); 
McCuskey, supra note 8, at 433–35 (tracing remand rates through docket data). 
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potential is defined by reasoning and hierarchy, rather than availability.28 At least 
at the district court level, all opinions—reported or unreported—carry the same 
initial potential to supply precedent because use of and citation to any opinion is 
fair game.29 Publication in a reporter simply signals the authoring judges’ and 
West editors’ view that an opinion may have greater import or power to persuade 
than other opinions on the issue.30  
Once a district court exercises its discretion to write a reasoned opinion, 
Westlaw and Lexis capture all of the opinions designated for reporter publication 
and now capture most, but not all, of the unreported opinions. Among opinions 
(as opposed to decisions in all forms), Westlaw thus over-represents those se-
lected for the reporters, the potential for selection bias.31 Issue-by-issue and dis-
trict-by-district, however, Westlaw’s collection percentage varies.32 Several 
prior studies of decisions found Westlaw’s reported and unreported opinions 
were close to representative of the entire body of decisions on certain measures, 
minimizing the risk of biasing results on those particular topics.33  
These observations, coupled with electronic docketing, have enabled re-
searchers to study district courts from large, deep data sets. Recent studies have 
                                                        
28  See Part II, infra. 
29  This is in contrast to several Circuits’ rules stating that only opinions designated as “prec-
edential” may be considered precedent in that court. See generally, Kim et al., supra note 15; 
Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A 
Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 
WASH. L. REV. 217 (2006). Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
30  See Lizotte, supra note 25, at 140–42. 
31  See Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 
127, 131–32 (2012) (identifying potential selection bias based on past studies). Cf. Boyd, su-
pra note 19 at 261–62 (explaining that collection through commercial electronic databases, 
even when guided by PACER docket sheets, “errs on the side of undercounting the presence 
of opinions—by its very nature, it does not included [sic] written orders that have not been 
classified as opinions.”). 
32  See Lizotte, supra note 25 at 130–38. 
33  Those topics include Twombly dismissals, for example, Dodson, supra note 31, at 134–35 
(explaining that Westlaw databases may be “probative” in the study of Rule 12(b)(6) decisions 
and that even if Westlaw databases are unrepresentative, “it is not at all clear that they over 
represent dismissals”); dispositive motion decisions in complex cases, for example, Christina 
L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 898, 908 
n.13 (2013) (using hand-collected data from Westlaw’s Trial Pleading Database based on “rea-
son to believe that the Westlaw-drawn data,” as opposed to raw docket data, “do allow [the 
authors] to get as close as is practical” to a true sample of veil-piercing complaints in federal 
courts); and ideology expressed in opinions, for example, Keele et al., supra note 27, at 228, 
233 (studying 479 opinions involving the U.S. Forest Service, identified through dockets, and 
explaining that “[i]deology was not significantly associated with district court judges’ deci-
sions in either published or unpublished opinions.”). 
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illuminated the influences, processes,34 and practical results of district court de-
cision-making,35 often in the context of dispositive motions.36 Despite academic 
consensus on including both reported and unreported cases, and the statistical 
power that large data sets can offer, each new study presents some innovation on 
methods for collecting and sampling decisions. And each new study justifies its 
inclusion and methods in terms of the specific substantive or procedural iceberg 
studied, suggesting that consensus on the standard for accessing district court 
decisions remains elusive.37  
                                                        
34  Boyd, supra note 19 at 257–58 (identifying legal and institutional constraints on district 
judges’ decision whether to write opinions); Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 33 at 905 (identi-
fying influence of various information exchanges on the likelihood of settlement). See gener-
ally Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District Courts, 
44 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (2015) (providing insight into how judging significantly differs by 
court level); Chad M. Oldfather et al., Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated 
Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 1189 (2012) (employing automated content coding to assess appellate court opinions’ 
responsiveness to parties briefing); cf. Christina L. Boyd et al., Building a Taxonomy of Liti-
gation: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
253 (2013) (using cluster analysis to identify patterns in presentation of pleadings). 
Bert Huang and Tejas Narechania developed a particularly useful and unique data set of 
Illinois state appellate opinions, which, although not directly relevant to federal district courts, 
sheds fascinating insight into courts’ publication of opinions. See Bert I. Huang & Tejas N. 
Narechania, Judicial Priorities, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1719 (2015). 
35  The impact of Twombly and Iqbal has been particularly piquant. See, e.g., Jill Curry & 
Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs File? A Study Comparing 
Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 827 (2013) (using empirical study to dispute 
supposition that plaintiffs would file more frequently in notice-pleading states after Twombly); 
Dodson, supra note 31 (studying the effect of Tw-Iqbal on dismissal of claims for legal or 
factual insufficiency); David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of 
Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (offering a critique of then-existing empirical 
studies of Twombly); Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iq-
bal, 68 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (studying plausibility pleading from the summary 
judgment standpoint and illustrating the potential immeasurability of any quality-screening 
effects from Twombly); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 
8 VA. L. REV. 2118, 2138 (2015) (examining more than 4,000 motions to dismiss decisions 
culled from PACER dockets). 
36  See generally, e.g., Burbank, supra note 27 (summary judgement); Lizotte, supra note 25 
at 132–38 (summary judgment); articles cited supra note 35 (motions to dismiss). 
37  By contrast, judges and practitioners have reached de facto consensus that legal research 
may competently be done by consulting Westlaw or Lexis alone. See McCuskey, supra note 
8 at 441 (discussing Rule 11 competence standards for legal research). This practitioner con-
sensus is based on professional standards of competence, like Federal Rule 11 and ABA Model 
Rule 1.1, that seek only the “thoroughness . . . reasonably necessary for the representation,” 
not for scientific, statistical, or holistic conclusion. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). Notably, these professional standards are satisfied as long as the law-
yer competently looks wherever his adversary and the presiding judge would look in that par-
ticular case. See Lawrence D. MacLachlan, Gandy Dancers on the Web: How the Internet Has 
Raised the Bar on Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility to Research and Know the Law, 13 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607, 612–17 (2000). Yet the volume of available law makes conven-
tional research a substantial endeavor. See id. The judicial consensus is reflected in the broad 
deference to “professional competence” in the judicial code of conduct. 
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Against this rich empirical backdrop and rising tide of decision data, this 
article turns to doctrinal questions about the body of law being developed under 
these influences and processes and to a study of removal jurisdiction. Particu-
larly, this project raises several questions about the remand opinions not col-
lected by the commercial electronic databases—the opinions I call submerged 
precedent—and their impact on the precedential system and those it serves most 
urgently: courts and practitioners.  
B. Choosing an Iceberg  
This project samples only one iceberg in the vast sea of legal precedents: 
remand decisions in embedded federal-question removals. Embedded federal 
question removals are those in which the defendant alleges that one or more state-
law claims filed against him turn on a substantial question of federal law and thus 
qualify for federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Supreme 
Court’s synthesis in Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing.38 In Grable, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split over the 
scope of embedded federal-question jurisdiction, holding that the existence of a 
federal private right of action was relevant to, but not dispositive of, the federal 
question’s requisite substantiality.39 The Court’s prior opinion in Merrell Dow v. 
Thompson had concluded that: 
the congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the 
violation of [a] federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the 
presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of 
action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.40 
Several Circuits had interpreted Merrell Dow to forbid embedded federal-
question jurisdiction unless the federal statute in question had a private right of 
action, while others treated it as simply a plus factor in the “substantial[ity]” 
analysis.41 Grable clarified that, “Merrell Dow should be read . . . as treating the 
absence of a federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dis-
positive of, the ‘sensitive judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 re-
quires.”42  
I collected the data employed here for an earlier project looking at remand 
outcomes before and after Grable’s moment of clarity.43 In that data collection, 
I attempted to collect all remand decisions from a sample of district courts on 
either side of the circuit split Grable resolved in the three years before and after 
Grable to get a snapshot of the decision-making landscape.44 I just wanted a solid 
                                                        
38  Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
39  Id. at 314. 
40  Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 814 (1986). 
41  See Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. 
42  Id. at 318 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 
(1986)). 
43  McCuskey, supra note 8. 
44  See id. at 453–54 (Appendix 2: Remand Rate Coding Information & Variables). 
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count of outcomes (percent remanded) before and after. My method for collect-
ing these data and some features I observed in it prompted this second project.  
Grable decisions, as a procedural topic, do not necessarily make an ideal 
sample from which to study precedent, for reasons discussed below. But this data 
set still offers some insight into the availability of district court decisions and 
potential impacts on the development of precedent. 
The Grable data set contains 185 decisions from two district courts (the 
Northern District of Illinois and Eastern District of Virginia) in cases filed be-
tween January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2008. I initially selected these two dis-
tricts based on their established positions on either side of Grable’s circuit split 
and their relatively high case loads, hoping to draw a good number of decisions.45  
In my effort to capture all instances of Grable decisions in these courts, I 
sought every case in which the issue was decided in whatever manner, suspecting 
that some number of Grable decisions would be memorialized in orders or state-
ments too short to be included in Westlaw or Lexis’s commercial databases. I 
did, however, only attempt to capture observable decisions—those written in 
some form.46 My collection therefore used a docket-based approach, rather than 
a random sampling from Westlaw. Using PACER and the BloombergLaw inter-
face with PACER, I collected dockets for every case meeting the following cri-
teria: (1) filed between January 1, 2002 and December, 31, 2008 and (2) docketed 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 removal as “cause of action” and “federal question” as 
the basis for jurisdiction.47  
I culled the dockets to capture only those cases in which the court actually 
decided an issue of Grable jurisdiction in the context of removal and remand. By 
reading the docket entries and underlying documents, I therefore excluded all 
instances in which the court never reached the jurisdictional question,48 and those 
that adjudicated jurisdiction over federal claims, as opposed to state-law claims.  
I then compared the set of decisions culled from dockets to those decisions 
captured by a Westlaw search.49 I searched Westlaw’s databases containing each 
                                                        
45  See id. at 418–26 (describing data collection). 
46  By setting the outer boundary at written decisions, I have excluded those reasoned decisions 
announced orally and all reasoning confined solely to the decision-maker’s mind. The concept 
of precedent is not confined to written work. See generally Oldfather, supra note 9 (offering a 
thorough and incisive exploration of decisions whether to write an opinion at all). Nor is prec-
edent defined by publication or availability, though publication and availability play pivotal 
roles in bringing precedent to courts’ and litigants’ attention. 
47  This was accomplished by creating reports in the PACER Civil Cases Reports feature of 
actions filed under the removal statute, 28 U.S.C § 1441, denoting “federal question” as the 
jurisdiction. 
48  For example, if the case settled before resolution of a remand motion, or had no remand 
motion at all. 
49  See McCuskey, supra note 8, at 424. Satisfied with the parity between Westlaw and Lexis, 
I chose only one database for efficiency. See id. (tracing the evolution of the competing data-
bases and their functionally identical case content). Of the two, I chose Westlaw based on my 
experience and some historical factors. See id. 
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district court for embedded federal-question decisions during the sampled time 
period and cross-referenced the results with my docket list.50 This sifting pro-
duced 185 unique decisions. 
Each of the 185 decisions included in the data set was coded for the follow-
ing fields, among others:51  
 Source (Westlaw / docket only) 
 Depth (Order / Opinion) 
 Publication (Published in a reporter / Not published in a reporter) 
 Nature of Suit (PACER Code) 
 Outcome (Remand / No Remand / Partial Remand)52 
 Judge (Name) 
 Reliance on Grable factors (in reasoning). 
For the Depth field, the coding relied on the Judicial Conference’s definition 
of “written opinion[]” as “any document issued by a judge . . . that sets forth a 
reasoned explanation for a court’s decision.”53 Thus decisions that supplied de-
tailed reasoning for the result reached were coded as “opinions,” while simple 
statements of the result were coded as “orders.” Detailed reasoning had to include 
citation to and discussion of legal authorities and application to the instant com-
plaint. Decisions relying only on the removal and jurisdiction statutes, parties’ 
briefing, or both, were classified as “orders.”  
Those decisions not available in Westlaw but containing enough reasoning 
to satisfy the Judicial Conference’s definition of “written opinion”54 constitute 
the submerged precedent at the heart of this project.  
The labor involved in finding these submerged precedents is what submerges 
them from the view of conventional research. While decisions in Westlaw and 
Lexis are finely indexed, digested, tagged, and categorized by experts, the world 
of court dockets is not. PACER renders dockets and the documents on them 
available to the public for a per-page fee or for free.55 But PACER is barely field-
searchable and cannot search across jurisdictions or years. Relative to Westlaw 
                                                        
50  See id. at 453. Using the search terms (REMOV! “ARISE UNDER” & REMAND! & 
“1441” “REMOVAL JURISDICTION” & (“FEDERAL QUESTION” “FEDERAL 
QUESTIONS”)) in the FED7-ALL database for the NDIL and FED4-ALL for the EDVa. Id. 
at 453. The Westlaw embedded federal question search did not produce any unique opinions—
all were also docketed. Data on file with author. 
51  For a detailed description of the coding process, see id. at 420–30, 453–55 (Appendix 2). 
52  This study found no instances of “Partial Remand” among the 185 cases. Data on file with 
author. 
53  Free Written Opinions, supra note 9. 
54  See id. 
55  PACER, supra note 6. Except for court opinions tagged in PACER as “Written Memo-
randa” by the court. Those are free. See Free Written Opinions, supra note 9. 
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and Lexis, PACER remains quite raw. As Hillel Levin aptly described it, to ef-
fectively search PACER “one would have to know what to look for in order to 
find it.”56  
The sifting process is even more onerous with dockets because it requires an 
additional layer of review: discovering whether the court actually decided an is-
sue involving embedded federal-question jurisdiction. While the docket sheet 
may have the requisite terms—“removal,” “remand,” and “federal question”—
those terms may appear in the context of numerous activities other than a deci-
sion on the issue.57 Notably, PACER makes a separate collection of those deci-
sions tagged in its database as “Written Opinions.” PACER’s Written Opinions 
collection not only culls decisions from the myriad other docket items, but also 
makes those Written Opinions available for free, pursuant to a statutory directive 
from the E-Government Act of 2002.58 None of the court orders and not every 
opinion are tagged as an Opinion, so a full count still requires docket research.  
To aid my docket research, I searched some relatively new interfaces for 
PACER’s raw data: the BloombergLaw database and the United States Govern-
ment Printing Office’s (GPO) FDSys collection. The recent introduction of 
BloombergLaw has coupled PACER’s content with a deeper search interface.59 
BloombergLaw enables the user to search multiple courts’ dockets and to con-
duct keyword searches for those dockets.60 Even with Bloomberg, however, you 
still have to dig because court decisions represent a tiny fraction of all documents 
on dockets. BloombergLaw also does not update in real time with PACER, leav-
ing out many very fresh dockets and entries.  
The even more recent introduction of a federal court opinions collection 
from the GPO has expanded free availability of opinions, though it remains far 
from complete at this moment. The GPO, in a collaborative project with the 
United States Courts Administrative Office (USCAO), makes selected opinions 
from selected federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts available to the 
                                                        
56  Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 
973, 985 (2008). 
57  And even a decision by the court is not guaranteed to reach the ultimate issue, even if it 
bears the search terms. As an example, one judge in the N.D. Ill. frequently issues a stock 
order days after a removal that dismisses the complaint “without prejudice to the filing of a 
timely motion to remand or the filing of a proper amended federal complaint” and requires the 
parties “to fully exhaust all settlement possibilities prior to filing any further pleadings.” 
Minutes, Watson v. City of Chicago, (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-03581). This de-
cision does not reach embedded federal question issues. And this disposition rarely is followed 
by the “timely motion to remand” or “amended federal complaint” it contemplates. 
58  E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
59  See Dockets, BLOOMBERG L., http://www.bloomberglaw.com/dockets [https://perma.c 
c/S94B-EAEF] (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
60  See id. 
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internet-going public for free on its Federal Digital System (FDSys).61 While the 
interface for this system is somewhat less technical than PACER, FDSys does 
not yet have a comprehensive collection.62 Happily for my purposes, however, 
FDSys does include the Northern District of Illinois and the years encompassed 
by my study, so I am able to check my results there and include password-free 
links to some opinions housed there.  
Unlike PACER, FDSys contains only opinions, not full dockets, and FDSys 
allows keyword searches within the opinions across jurisdictions and years, as 
well as filtering results. It appears from anecdotal testing that the documents the 
GPO has collected on FDSys are opinions from PACER that the authoring judge 
has tagged for collection as a “Written Opinion.”63 Although Westlaw and 
FDSys both appear to draw solely from those PACER “Written Opinion” collec-
tions, FDSys does include a very few submerged precedents and does not per-
fectly track Westlaw’s inclusion.64 
Finding court decisions and determining whether those docket entries con-
tain a decision about embedded federal-question jurisdiction is more time-con-
suming outside the Westlaw and FDSys decision-only databases and without 
Westlaw’s guiding synopses and topical digests. In an effort to compare apples 
to apples to the greatest extent possible, my sample includes only decisions that 
directly address the issue of embedded federal-question jurisdiction. 
So my small sample of submerged decisions belies a large effort in finding 
that sample. And that effort is the first part of the problem: that submerged prec-
edents are effectively out of sight through all reasonable and conventional re-
search. My docket searches65 in Bloomberg and PACER yielded an average of 
8.65 percent positive hits in the Northern District of Illinois dockets and 25.58 
percent in the Eastern District of Virginia.66 For example, my coder and I sifted 
                                                        
61  See FDsys: United States Court Opinions, U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF. (GPO) http://www.gp 
o.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=USCOURTS [https://perma.cc/T3Z6-
R9WF] (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
62  See id. (including only forty-four district courts in a collection dating back to 2004). 
63  See, e.g., Illinois v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. 13-C-1725, 2013 WL 1874279 (N.D. Ill. May 
2, 2013) (Memorandum Opinion and Order also available at http://www.gp 
o.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_13-cv-01725/pdf/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_13-cv-01725-
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7GT-JEVN]); Anco v. Acco Brands, Inc., No. 10-C-4275, 2010 WL 
3034732 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2010) (Statement Opinion also available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_10-cv-04275/pdf/USCOURTS-ilnd-
1_10-cv-04275-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB3Z-CRD9]). 
64  See, e.g., Clarke v. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 303, No. 11-cv-2210 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2011), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_11-cv-02210/pdf/USCOURTS-ilnd-
1_11-cv-02210-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/28UL-KBFJ]; McCuskey, supra note 8, at 427–30 
(comparing coverage of online opinion-collection services). See generally Part III.B. 
65  I searched within the specified courts for docket text including “federal question” and “re-
moval” and “remand” and reasonable iterations of those terms. 
66  A positive hit is a docket containing an actual decision about embedded federal-question 
jurisdiction. The resulting positive hits were distributed somewhat more evenly between the 
two districts with about 60 percent coming from Illinois and 40 percent from Virginia. 
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through 228 dockets and identified 27 decisions on embedded federal questions 
for 2008 alone.67 This study currently includes seven years (2002–2008) and 185 
decisions from dockets and Westlaw. 
C. The Submerged World 
I compared the docket decisions on embedded federal-question jurisdiction 
with those results available on Westlaw and tracked the various characteristics 
through the coding fields. This section uses that coding to compare the jurisdic-
tional decisions submerged on court dockets with their more widely-available 
counterparts included in Westlaw. 
1.  Opinions Versus Orders 
Looking purely at decisional outcomes (to remand or not), dockets make a 
difference in this study, as in others.68 The overall remand rate in the Illinois 
court for this seven-year span was 76 percent remanded. In the decisions availa-
ble on Westlaw, the remand rate was only 62 percent. In the decisions submerged 
on dockets, the remand rate was 85 percent, suggesting that Westlaw’s overall 
picture of remand probabilities is rosier than the docketed reality across all cate-
gories. About 60 percent of all the decisions in the database were submerged on 
dockets, so the iceberg metaphor still holds true for remand decisions considered 
as a whole, including both explained opinions and unexplained orders.69  
Just over half of the decisions (56 percent) came with reasoned elaborations. 
The majority (70 percent) of those reasoned elaborations are available on 
Westlaw.70 But nearly 30 percent of the reasoned explanations are available only 
on dockets. These submerged precedents—reasoned opinions available only on 
dockets—thus comprise 17 percent of all remand decisions and 30 percent of 
those opinions with putative precedential value in this sample, as reflected in 
Figure 1. 
                                                        
67  In real numbers, this translates to, for example, 185 hits in Illinois for the year 2008, with 
16 positive hits resulting. For the same year, Virginia had 43 hits with 11 positive hits result-
ing. The database covers 2002–2008. 
68  See, e.g., McCuskey, supra note 8, at 421 n.191, 439–40 (surveying other prior studies 
including docket data); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 4 (employment law research in-
volving dockets). 
69  In the Northern District of Illinois, the ratio was 60.65 percent to 39.35 percent. In the 
Eastern District of Virginia, the ratio was 58.33 percent submerged to 41.67 percent on 
Westlaw. See also McCuskey, supra note 8, at 440 (finding 60 percent submergence rate in 
previous analysis, as well). Brian Lizotte’s study of 607 summary judgment grants similarly 
found that 60 percent of those grants had no corresponding entry in Westlaw or Lexis. Lizotte, 
supra note 25, at 129, 134. (describing the remaining 40 percent of decisions on Westlaw and 
Lexis as “available”). The Northern District of Illinois was among the courts in his study, with 
52 percent of its decisions available, while the Eastern District of Virginia was not. Id. at 131, 
144. Lizotte’s study does not differentiate among bare orders and opinions, so does not calcu-
late submergence of opinions. 
70  All of the decisions on Westlaw contain reasons. 
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FIGURE 1: REASONING IN ALL REMAND DECISIONS SAMPLED 
To shift focus from mere outcomes to potential precedents, the remainder of 
this project compares reasoned opinions found in the submerged 17 percent with 
the Westlaw 39 percent, omitting the bare orders, which make up the remaining 
44 percent of all adjudications. 
2.  Substantive Law Applied 
The purpose of comparison here is to investigate whether submergence may 
influence the path of precedent by skewing the substantive law. At the appellate 
level, quantitative evidence exists “that publication decisions, when combined 
with [now mostly defunct] limited-citation rules, do affect the substance of prec-
edential law.”71 But this small sample did not demonstrate the power to answer 
the question,72 because the decisions it captures were spread out over too many 
substantive areas. Deeper content analysis of the sample does, however, suggest 
the potential for submerged precedent to skew substantive law.  
The types of cases raising embedded federal-question jurisdiction issues in-
clude a range of underlying substantive disputes. For an initial classification of 
the type of underlying dispute, the coding captured the Nature of Suit (NOS) 
numeric code associated with each docket, selected by the filing party at the time 
                                                        
71  Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publica-
tion in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 120 (2001); see also FED. 
R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, 
orders, judgments, or other written dispositions . . . designated as ‘unpublished’ . . . [or] ‘non-
precedential’ . . . .”). Although Rule 32.1 lifted the citation restriction in 2007, courts retain 
the power to designate certain opinions as “non-precedential.” See generally Scott E. Gant, 
Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2006). 
72  See generally LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
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of filing.73 My sample captured decisions with 32 different NOS designations 
among PACER’s 100 NOS codes.74  
The decisions are fairly spread out across the diverse categories.75 Only a 
few codes have an observably higher portion of decisions in the collection: mis-
cellaneous federal statutes (22.7 percent), ERISA (16.21 percent), miscellaneous 
civil rights (10.81 percent), miscellaneous contract (8.11 percent), airplane per-
sonal injury (4.32 percent), insurance (4.32 percent), and miscellaneous fraud 
(3.24 percent) cases.76 Sorting by the subject-matter of the litigation reveals some 
superficial information about how embedded federal-question jurisdiction fares 
in that substantive context and whether those decisions are submerged.  
Table 1, below, tracks the submergence rate and remand rate across these 
popular categories, illustrating this sample’s diffusion and the small sample 
available in each nature of suit category (the n). Even the most populous category 
is “Miscellaneous Federal Statutes.”  
                                                        
73  See Civil Cover Sheet, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FormsAnd-
Fees/Forms/JS044.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJW4-MKHP] (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). On first 
filing in a federal district court, the filing party must fill out a Civil Cover Sheet form desig-
nating tracking and routing information for the clerk’s office. The form requires the filing 
party to designate the single most appropriate “Nature of Suit” code describing the litigation. 
See id. (“If the cause fits more than one nature of suit, select the most definitive.”); see also 
Nature of Suit, PUB. ACCESS TO CT. ELECTRONIC RECORDS, [hereinafter PACER NOS Codes], 
http://www.pacer.gov/documents/natsuit.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LPN-ASH5] (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2015). My coding simply accepts the removing defendant’s selection of the single 
most appropriate code to describe the litigation. I did not compare the selected Nature of Suit 
code with the open-field “Cause of Action” information. But review of any resulting remand 
decision’s content often helped establish a finer understanding of the dispute. 
74  The list includes 100 codes, several of which have now been eliminated. PACER NOS 
Codes, supra note 73. 
75  At the most general level of classification, I found approximately 19 percent labor, 15 per-
cent civil rights, 13 percent torts, 12 percent contract, 3 percent intellectual property, and 1 
percent each real property and habeas corpus cases. The remaining 33 percent was defined by 
particular federal statutes. Id. 
76  The remaining codes have less than 3 percent of the decisions, and often only one decision, 
associated with them. Id. 
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TABLE 1: SUBMERGENCE BY SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPUTES 















42 73.68% 81.58% 89.29% 60.00% 
ERISA 30 31.82% 63.64% 100.00% 46.67% 
Misc. Civil 
Rights 
20 72.22% 88.89% 100.00% 60.00% 
Misc. Contract 15 54.55% 72.73% 83.33% 60.00% 
Airplane Injury 8 62.50% 87.50% 100.00% 66.67% 
Insurance 8 80.00% 80.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Misc. Fraud 6 50.00% 83.33% 100.00% 66.67% 
Submergence varies widely among the most popular subject matters, with 
ERISA decisions being the most often collected by Westlaw. In each of these 
popular categories, Westlaw continues to paint a rosier picture of remand prob-
abilities than submerged precedent does, with the exception of the Telephone 
Consumers Protection Act,81 which has a 100 percent remand rate in both 
Westlaw and submerged opinions.82 If, however, a party searched Westlaw for 
precedents in an ERISA or civil rights removal, it might appear from the case 
outcomes that he had a 50/50 shot at being remanded. If the same party looked 
at those opinions only available on dockets, he might conclude that remand is 
nearly certain. The truer outcome measure, therefore, would include both sub-
merged and available opinions. 
But parties and their lawyers rarely will care about outcome counts at this 
level of generality, and outcomes themselves do not contribute to precedent. In-
stead the reasoning behind those outcomes determines which are relevant to the 
calculation in any particular case and which are inapplicable. Only the quality 
and content of an opinion’s reasoning can determine whether the application of 
the law is skewed by submergence.  
Coding the content of these opinions proved much more difficult than the 
features and outcomes. Although the coding was inconclusive on the skew cal-
culations, some examples of submerged reasoning compared with Westlaw rea-
soning suggest that the potential for skew is not zero.  
                                                        
77  The portion of decisions within each Nature of Suit Code that appear only on dockets. 
78  The portion of decisions within each Nature of Suit Code that remand the case. 
79  The portion of submerged decisions within each Nature of Suit Code that remand the case. 
80  The portion of the decisions available in Westlaw that remand the case. 
81  47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012). 
82  Data on file with author. 
16 NEV. L.J. 515 MCCUSKEY - FINAL.DOCX 4/12/2016  6:54 PM 
534 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:515  
3.  Content Coding 
The content coding for this database painfully illustrated the nuanced nature 
of precedent, as well as the effort required to identify it. Due largely to the com-
plex legal test captured in this sample, the content coding remains inconclusive 
as to whether submerged precedent actually skews the development of the law. 
Grable synthesized the test for embedded federal-question jurisdiction, permit-
ting federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims where “a state-law claim 
[1] necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, [2] actually disputed and [3] sub-
stantial, [4] which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congres-
sionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”83 The 
four-factor legal test and layered analysis in Grable resulted in significant ambi-
guity in coding, arguably reflecting some of Grable’s inherent complexity. 
 Initially, it is difficult to distinguish among Grable’s four factors in many 
opinions—whether submerged or available in Westlaw. Even opinions with ob-
vious holdings and clear delineation of factors may base the result on failure of 
multiple factors. Thus, the opinions exercising jurisdiction often have more ob-
viously-stated bases than those remanding because exercising jurisdiction re-
quires satisfactory analysis of all four factors.  
Still the most formidable obstacle to making a reliable conclusion about 
skew in the law from this sample is the context-specific analysis of embedded 
federal-question jurisdiction itself. The Grable inquiry analyzes both the “sub-
stantiality” of the embedded federal issue and the “necessity” of its relationship 
to the state substantive law claim asserted.84 While isolating one defined legal 
issue (embedded federal-question jurisdiction) at one procedural juncture (re-
moval and remand), the legal issue in this study incorporates a wide variety of 
substantive law relevant into its application. Grable provides the jurisdictional 
law, and submerged precedent explaining Grable’s application may skew the in-
terpretation and clarification of the ambiguities in Grable’s factors. But Grable’s 
application at least partly depends on the source of the federal question alleged.  
For example, the most useful precedent for Grable jurisdiction over a state-
law contract claim raising an issue of federal copyright law would involve both 
interpretation of what Grable’s “substantiality” factor means generally and an 
analysis of Congressional intent for the federal copyright statute specifically. 
Grable’s “substantiality” factor always requires analysis of the federal issue’s 
import to the federal system, judged by Congressional intent.85 But the analysis 
                                                        
83  Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). See 
Andrew D. Bradt, Grable on the Ground: Mitigating Unchecked Jurisdictional Discretion, 44 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1153, 1160–76 (2011) (enumerating Grable’s factors). 
84  See, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, You Can’t Go Holmes Again, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 237, 282 
(2012) (describing embedded federal question jurisdiction as “coupling state law causes of 
action with federal rights”). 
85  Grable, 545 U.S. at 314 (“[T]here must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent 
in exercising federal jurisdiction.”). 
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of whether the federal copyright issue has import would be only partially relevant 
(or wholly irrelevant) to whether issues about civil rights, environmental, or 
ERISA had import. The copyright analysis may offer useful reasoning about how 
to determine Congressional intent for substantiality purposes, but more likely 
will turn on statute-specific reasoning persuasive only in context of copyright 
removals. And, even then, substantiality is only one of the Grable’s four fac-
tors.86 
Although the precedent for applying the embedded federal question tests it-
self constitutes a body of law, each application’s meaningfulness for future cases 
will vary significantly based on the source of the federal law alleged to be em-
bedded. In this study, coding for the Nature of Suit code in each case illustrated 
this variation because it captured the removing party’s initial characterization of 
the source of the federal law alleged to be embedded. All of the opinions in this 
sample provide precedent for embedded federal-question analysis, generally. But 
very few opinions landed in each category of Grable analysis and a particular 
federal question alleged.87  
Opportunities to more precisely test submerged precedent’s effects on sub-
stantive law abound for further study.88 Some additional areas of that law which 
might prove especially fruitful could be (1) a rarely-appealed procedural juncture 
in one substantive area of law and (2) dispositive motions in one substantive area 
of law. These might, for example, be found among motions for pre-complaint 
discovery in antitrust cases and motions to dismiss in civil rights cases.  
D. Possible Submerging Forces 
Analysis of the data collection here reveals some recurring features of sub-
merged opinions. Those features suggest that particularly strong submerging 
forces come from judges’ managerial discretion, the technology used to collect 
and access case law, the structure of the substantive law applied, a decision’s 
appealability, and the sophistication of the parties. This section remains obser-
vational and does not attempt to demonstrate statistical correlation between these 
factors and submergence. This is partly in respect of the small sample size and 
mostly due to the difficulty encountered in coding the decisions’ content. 
                                                        
86  See id. (establishing four-part test for embedded federal-question jurisdiction). 
87  In the embedded copyright question mentioned above, for example, there were only four 
total decisions, all of which were submerged. Each opinion appeared to be based on a different 
aspect of the four Grable factors, making it a question of legal research, not empirics. See, 
e.g., Table 1, supra (displaying very small n even for the largest grouping). 
88  See, e.g., studies collected at notes 27 and 33, supra, which successfully study both proce-
dure and the substantive law context in which it operates. 
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1.  Discretion and Technology 
 On a managerial level, district court judges maintain broad authority to man-
age how litigation unfolds in their courtrooms.89 In their role as decision-makers, 
judges must decide whether to write, how much to write, what form their writing 
should take, and whether to broadcast their writing, all of which respond to the 
circumstances of individual cases and invoke judges’ discretion to manage 
cases.90 Caseload has proven to be a particularly salient force in choosing 
whether to write,91 or at least the justification for exercising that choice.92 
The initial choice to hold hearings or decide an issue on paper has some 
bearing on the submergence of any decision resulting from this choice. The da-
taset compiled here includes numerous instances of an unexplained order cou-
pled with a notation that the accompanying reasons or explanations were stated 
orally at a hearing.93 In these instances, the court announced potentially prece-
dential reasoning, but did so “in open court” without an accessible written rec-
ord.94 
Courts frequently justify granting a hearing based on the complexity of the 
issue presented and the desirability of hearing argument from the parties beyond 
what is stated in their briefing.95 So, while oral argument on a motion offers liti-
gants a physical satisfaction of having their “day in court,” in the remand order 
                                                        
89  See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77 (1982). 
90  See generally Boyd, supra note 19. 
91  See id. at 6–7. 
92  Pether, supra note 14, at 1442–65 (unearthing the origins of appellate court unpublication 
as a reaction to distaste for pro se prisoner postconviction appeals, rather than general work-
load considerations). 
93  See, e.g., Order, Skomra v. Cordier, No. 1:08-cv-0720 (E.D. Va. Aug. 15, 2008) (denying 
remand motion “[f]or the reasons stated in open court”). 
94  Id. While district courts record hearing on transcripts, those transcripts are not part of 
PACER’s public access system. To view a transcript, one must purchase the transcript sepa-
rately and at much higher cost than PACER’s $0.10/page document fee. If plaintiff raises the 
remand issue in a motion, the accompanying briefing by the parties offers some context to the 
arguments advanced on either side. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, Skomra v. Cor-
dier, No. 1:08-cv-0720 (E.D. Va. 2008) (arguing for remand because removal failed on two 
grounds: (1) it did not satisfy the three elements for a “federal officer” removal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), (2) it failed to establish immunity under federal common law). 
95  See Vaughn v. Astrue, 412 F. App’x 559, 560 (4th Cir. 2011) (dispensing with oral argu-
ment on appeal “because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the mate-
rials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process”); see also FED. R. 
APP. P. 34(a)(2) (requiring oral argument unless the panel agrees it is unnecessary because 
“(A) the appeal is frivolous; (B) the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively de-
cided; or (C) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, 
and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.”); FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 8019 (“Oral argument must be allowed . . . unless . . . the facts and legal arguments 
are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be 
significantly aided by oral argument.”); Order, J.T. v. Fairfax Cty Sch. Bd., No. 1:08-cv-717 
(E.D. Va. 2008) (“Because the parties agree that oral argument is unnecessary [on the remand 
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context, oral argument as the sole repository of a court’s reasoning raises con-
cerns for the development of clarifying precedent in close cases.  
A judge’s initial, discretionary decision to write her decision triggers the 
next potentially submerging force: discretion in the commercial databases’ col-
lection process. PACER and, by proxy, BloombergLaw, contain raw data. These 
databases simply make available all of the documents filed by all of the parties 
in all of the cases and proceedings before each federal district court. Bloomberg 
provides an interface to make it easier to find those raw data.96 However, Bloom-
berg does not perform an editorial function in determining what will be available 
through the interface.  
Westlaw and FDSys add levels of filtration to the contents of their data-
bases.97 FDSys purports to contain only opinions, not mere orders or other docket 
documents. Westlaw contains both opinions and a selection of docket documents 
such as pleadings and briefs. Westlaw’s opinion-acquisition methods vary by ju-
risdiction and court.98  
District judges can, to a great extent, determine which “decisions should 
comprise the visible [body of putative] precedent[s].”99 District judges are not 
required to send Westlaw and Lexis their opinions. They may, however, desig-
nate decisions for publication in a reporter, send them to Westlaw, or tag them 
as “Written Opinions” in PACER, determining the cost and ease of access. 
Although federal district court decisions remain more difficult to acquire 
than federal appellate decisions,100 Westlaw does include federal district court 
unreported decisions “based upon editorial determination.”101 In particular, 
Westlaw makes a concerted effort to collect all decisions tagged as “Written 
                                                        
motion] and because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in the existing 
record, oral argument is dispensed with, as it would not aide the decisional process.”). 
96  BLOOMBERG L., http://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/5C8E-2VMS] (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2016). 
97  THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com [https://perma.cc/4EMC-AF8Z] 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2016); FDsys, U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF., http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
[https://perma.cc/FAV9-Z88Z] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
98  See E-mail from Katherine MacEachern, Attorney Editor, Westlaw Judicial Editorial Op-
erations, to author (Sept. 6, 2013, 17:14) (on file with author). 
99  McCuskey, supra note 8, at 429; see also Levin, supra note 56 (noting that district court 
judges are not required to send LEXIS or Westlaw their opinions). See generally Siegelman 
& Donohue, supra note 4 (explaining the different publication requirements for district 
courts). 
100  Federal appellate courts must, by law, make all published and “unpublished” opinions 
available on their court websites. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-347, 
§ 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). (requiring court websites to provide “[a]ccess to the sub-
stance of all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to 
be published in the official court reporter, in a text searchable format”); see also McCuskey, 
supra note 8 (finding that all appellate opinions sampled were included in Westlaw). 
101  See E-mail from MacEachern, supra note 98. 
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Opinions” during the docketing process.102 PACER makes it easy to find opin-
ions with this tag and provides them for free. Largely whatever is free in PACER 
is available in Westlaw. While the Judicial Conference defines “Written Opin-
ion” as “any document issued by a judge . . . that sets forth a reasoned explana-
tion for a court’s decision,” the responsibility for labeling decisions with this 
administrative designation rests with the authoring judge.103 Notably, all of this 
data set’s opinions from Westlaw also had the “Written Opinion” tag in 
PACER.104  
District judges also choose the form any written explanation will take, and 
this choice may influence its availability or submergence from view. For exam-
ple, the Northern District of Illinois from 2005 to 2014 used an “Order Form 
(01/2005),” which allowed a judge to enter docket text, as well as a separate 
single-spaced “Statement.”105 Many, but not all, of the submerged opinions in 
the Northern District appear in this form. Conversely very few decisions issued 
on the form made their way to Westlaw.106 
Judges docketed reasoned opinions of considerable length in this form, ra-
ther than as a “Written Opinion” or the customary typed, double-spaced order 
with a fully-formatted caption.107 Use of this particular form is confined to the 
judges in the Northern District of Illinois (NDIL)108 and it does not appear in the 
Eastern District of Virginia sample. This form of order was introduced in the 
                                                        
102  See id. 
103  Free Written Opinions, supra note 9 (emphasis added). 
104  But the converse is not true—at least a few of the opinions submerged in PACER also had 
the “Written Opinion” tag. 
105  E.g., Document 8, James v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., No. 1:08-cv-01500 (N.D. Ill., 2008). 
106  See, e.g., Document 13, Munoz v. Ekl, Williams & Provenzale LLC, No. 1:13-cv-01454 
(N.D. Ill. 2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_13-cv-01454/pdf/US 
COURTS-ilnd-1_13-cv-01454-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ52-E5K5]. 
107  In Omnicare, Inc. v. Walgreensn, the court submerged a 1,240-word remand opinion ana-
lyzed at length the legal question whether parties could prospectively waive their right to re-
mand in a contract’s forum-selection clause. See Document 31, Omnicare, Inc. v. Walgreens 
Health Initiatives, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-03901 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that the parties’ contract 
did waive removal and therefore remanding) (reprinted in Appendix 1). The remand opinion 
submerged on Marion v. Bank of America docket was over 2,000 words long, cited more than 
20 authorities, and tackled an array of issues from ERISA preemption, diversity jurisdiction, 
and Erie to the technical requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c). See Document 30, Marion v. 
Bank of Am., No. 1:08-cv-03867 (N.D. Ill. 2008); see also Document 37, Marion v. Bank of 
Am., No. 1:08-C-03867 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (1,500-word submerged opinion granting motion to 
dismiss). Because the opinion considered only preemption, not embedded federal question, as 
a basis for jurisdiction, it is not included in the embedded federal question calculations here. 
108  But see United States v. Miller, No. 08-CR-84/07-C-795 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 10, 2009), 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/wisconsin/wiedce/1:2009cv00795/5072 
8/4/0.pdf?127 0246219 [https://perma.cc/U848-AQ7T] (“Order Form” decision issued by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin by NDIL Judge Philip G. 
Reinhart, sitting by designation). 
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NDIL in 2005 and phased out by 2014.109 Although intended for efficiency and 
ease of docket entry, the form does seem to encourage writing a “Statement” 
supporting an order and therefore may encourage reasoned elaboration.110 Court 
administrators discontinued its use because judges who used the form were not 
being credited properly in their judicial statistics as having generated opinions.111 
But its bureaucratic status as a numbered “form” also may make it seem less 
appropriate for public consumption and therefore encourage submergence.  
The form is only a contributing factor, though. It does not dictate submerg-
ence. More crucially, judges must weigh the time it takes to write an opinion 
with the utility of having a written, reasoned elaboration accompany each deci-
sion.112 Easy cases and cases not likely to be reviewed by an appellate court can 
tip the balance away from reasoning—or at least away from elaborating reason-
ing in sufficient depth and refinement to be a candidate for publishing.113 
District judges thereby play two determining roles in Westlaw’s collection 
process: initially choosing whether to memorialize their decisions as written, rea-
soned elaborations, and then suggesting which of those written decisions 
Westlaw should collect for public consumption.114 The coding features of the 
decisions and analysis of their content suggests some additional forces that may 
influence these initial choices.  
2.  Structure, Complexity, and Appealability 
The structure of the applicable law may steer the decision whether and how 
to memorialize a decision. Intuitively, it makes sense that more demanding legal 
analysis would more likely produce a reasoned opinion and this intuition has 
borne out empirically in other studies. Christina Boyd’s work found that dispos-
itive motions correlated with increased opinion-writing, but that motions for 
summary judgment—as opposed to motions to dismiss—increased both opinion-
writing and the length of the opinions generated.115 She attributed this finding to 
                                                        
109  Memorandum from Krysten E. Beech to author (Feb. 18, 2015) (on file with author) (me-
morializing conversations with NDIL PACER Administrator, on file with author). See, e.g., 
Document 135, Gonzalez Jr. v. City of Chicago, No. 1:11-cv-08356 (N.D. Ill. March 28, 
2013). 
110  Memorandum from Krysten E. Beech, supra note 109. 
111  Id. 
112  Chad Oldfather has illuminated the nuanced relationship between writing and judging, ex-
amining the initial decision whether to supply reasoned explanations and the consequences of 
that choice. Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1283. Fortunately, this article largely avoids the exis-
tential questions of whether and when to offer reasoning by focusing only on those decisions 
with reasoning—that is, those with potential precedential value. In Part III, I discuss some 
implications of submerged precedent on the volume of written opinions. 
113  See generally Boyd, supra note 19. 
114  Accord Lizotte, supra note 25 (observing that the “dramatic underavailability [of decisions 
in the commercial databases] hardly seems to be the fault of Lexis or Westlaw”). 
115  See Boyd, supra note 19. 
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the more demanding legal standard of Federal Rule of Civil 56 and the rigors of 
applying law to fact.116 
Embedded federal-question remand, while not dispositive in the truest sense, 
has a lopsidedly demanding analytic structure. Grable’s four elements are con-
junctive: all four elements must be satisfied for court to exercise jurisdiction, 
while failure to satisfy only one dictates remand.117  
It seems an efficient choice, then, to write little when remanding based on 
the failure of one factor. By the same token, if a court must go through the effort 
of finding all four elements satisfied, then a written, reasoned elaboration seems 
a good return on that investment. It is not surprising that Westlaw would have a 
lower remand rate—it contains more of those decisions that take more effort.118  
The ease with which a court may dispose of a case under the structure of the 
applicable law is distinct from the concept of an “easy case.” The structure of the 
applicable law merely establishes how many hurdles a case must clear to stay in 
federal court. The “easy case,” by contrast, describes a set of facts or arguments 
that have a straightforward application of the law leading to an obvious and pre-
dictable result.119 
In easy cases, existing precedent and/or positive law fully and unequivocally 
determines the outcome.120 Many convincing legal arguments stand on their own 
ground, needing little or no precedential foundation because the arguments are 
based on logic, uncontestable statutory definitions, or a straightforward and fore-
seen application of law to fact. The sample captured in this study bore out the 
expectation that opinions in easy cases more often ended up submerged from 
                                                        
116  Id. She did not, however, acknowledge Rule 56’s suggestion that written explanation ac-
company a grant of the motion. 
117  Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 
118  Not all hurdles are set at the same height. In Grable, hurdles (3) and (4) require much more 
complex and discretionary analysis than hurdle (2). See, e.g., Bradt, supra note 83, at 1160–
76; McCuskey, supra note 8, at 405–09 (tracing each strand of Grable’s test). And hurdle (1), 
the time-honored well-pleaded complaint rule, has quite a lot of clarifying precedent support-
ing it, yet still requires a detailed examination of the allegations in each new complaint. See, 
McCuskey, supra note 8, at 405. A remand based solely on failure to satisfy the well-pleaded 
complaint requirement could be explained almost entirely by reference to the instant complaint 
and signals that defendant simply misread the complaint or threw a Hail Mary pass at removal. 
A remand based on lack of substantiality or imbalance in the federal system, however, would 
most likely involve some construction of federal laws and statutes, as well as consideration of 
federalism and other jurisdictional grants. 
119  See generally Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399 (1985). 
120  See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes on the Logic of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS 
INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 140–47 (Steven J. Burton ed., 
2000) (describing the Holmesian view of “the logic of easy cases”); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. 
McCauliff, supra note 22 at 161 (assessing the use of shorthand adjudication in deciding 
“easy” appellate cases); see, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 66 
(1997) (categorizing cases as either “easy” or “hard” for purposes of analysis); FRANK M. 
COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 275 (1994) (same); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 132–33, 157, 161 n.1 (1990); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 805–07 (1982). 
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view, likely owing to the authoring court’s discretion in determining whether an 
opinion contributes enough to warrant public consumption. Content analysis for 
the sample suggested that dispositive applications of the well-pleaded complaint 
rule ended up submerged more often than the more complicated analysis of Gra-
ble factors.  
Certainly, some easy Grable cases produced opinions captured by the data-
bases. Several of those easy cases appear to have a teaching function aimed at a 
pro se litigant in the case. Judge Milton Shadur’s unequivocal remand opinion in 
Leventhal v. Handeland121 stands as an example of an easy well-pleaded com-
plaint violation. The defendant had attempted to remove his divorce proceedings 
from state to federal court, alleging the state court’s sanctions against him vio-
lated his constitutional rights.122 The removal easily runs afoul of the well-
pleaded complaint. The fact that the court acted sua sponte and issued its opinion 
only four days after removal emphasizes the ease of its decision.123 And the opin-
ion’s language also underscores this ease: the opinion hints at a “number of fatal 
flaws” in the removal, but targets defects which “conclusively negate federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction,” citing “black-letter law” that “has been established and 
repeated by a host of cases.”124 This removal was not pushed from the edge of 
jurisdiction into the remand abyss; it “plainly” lacked jurisdiction.125 
So why write a memorandum opinion in such an easy and predictable case? 
Judge Shadur’s opinion suggests that he writes for the pro se defendant’s own 
edification.126 And the dockets reveal the need to convey the futility of removal 
to this particular defendant. Leventhal removed his divorce proceedings twice 
and was remanded twice before his third removal was assigned to Judge Sha-
dur.127  
Judge Shadur is not alone; the data set includes several instances of pointed 
opinions on easy issues for pro se parties.128 Judge Mark S. Davis, writing for 
                                                        
121  Leventhal v. Handeland, No. 09-C-01929, 2009 WL 928900, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2009). 
122  Id. 
123  See id. (noting sua sponte nature of opinion); Mem. Op. & Order, Leventhal v. Handeland, 
1:09-cv-01929 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2009) (issuing sua sponte opinion and ordering remand to 
state court four days after removal). 
124  Leventhal, 2009 WL 928900, at *1 (emphasis added) (citing Caterpillar v. Williams 482 
U.S. 339 (1987) and Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009)). 
125  Id. at *2. 
126  See id. at *1 (“Leventhal should not assume that, even if he were somehow able to sur-
mount [jurisdictional] defects, he could still bring the state court lawsuits into the federal court 
system.”). 
127  See Min. Entry, Leventhal v. Handeland, 1:08-cv-07374 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2009) (remand-
ing removal grounded on diversity after order to show cause); Min. Entry, Leventhal v. Han-
deland, 1:08-cv-01547 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2008) (remanding for failure to attach state-court 
pleadings to notice of removal). 
128  See, e.g., Remand Order, Graham v. Davis, 4:08-cv-00078 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2008) (ex-
plaining in a four-page opinion that the court remands for lack of a federal question over a 
simple promissory note dispute and that the pro se defendant’s removal was untimely). 
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the Eastern District of Virginia in Agner v. Shapiro, emphasized to the pro se 
defendant that the court was deciding only jurisdiction and “not” the merits of 
his dispute and that his case must return to state court because his federal Social 
Security issue arose “as a defense to Plaintiff[’s] claim.”129 As in Leventhal, the 
court in Agner issued a reasoned explanation after shorter orders failed to deter 
defendant from filing.130 Leventhal does stand out as one of the very few such 
cases in Westlaw. Most are submerged, like Agner. 
Leventhal and Agner illustrate how a reasoned opinion on an “easy” issue 
may serve didactic and communicative functions directed at pro se litigants. The 
opinion may attempt to deter further filings by the pro se party by explaining 
why he is being thrown out of court. This is especially important in cases where 
pro se litigants remove cases based explicitly on concerns for injustice being 
done to them in the state-court system. When the court decides to remand without 
a hearing, the reasoned written opinion also functions as formal communication 
between the court and the removing party. 
While these didactic opinions in easy pro se cases may serve several expres-
sive purposes within the instant case, they offer relatively little to the advance-
ment of doctrine and clarification of law for future litigants and jurists. That is, 
this class of opinions offers relatively little precedential value under the classic 
view of precedent. The didactic opinion’s deterrent power is hampered however, 
when submerged from view. In theory, the more available these didactic opinions 
are, the more powerful they can be at deterring erroneous pro se removals.131 In 
practice, of course, finding these “easy” opinions takes some direction and train-
ing that most pro se parties lack. Relatedly, studies of appellate opinions have 
suggested that appellate courts often demote decisions involving disadvantaged 
litigants, such as pro se prisoners and civil rights plaintiffs, to “unpublished” 
                                                        
129  Order, Agner v. Shapiro, 2:08-cv-00620 (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2009). 
130  Compare Order, Agner v. Shapiro, 2:08-cv-00620 (E.D. Va. Dec. 24, 2008) (remanding 
with short explanation that federal question jurisdiction was lacking based on the well-pleaded 
complaint rule) with Order, Agner v. Shapiro, 2:08-cv-00620 (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2009) (deny-
ing motion for reconsideration with a longer, more emphatic explanation of the federal de-
fense). But cf. Order, Morris v. Cherry, 2:08-cv-00433 (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2009) (A few months 
after winning a remand motion, the state court plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a motion 
requesting the federal court reverse the state court’s dismissal of his case. In its one-paragraph 
remand order, the district court explained: “As Plaintiff is well aware, there is no federal ques-
tion presented, and thus, this Court has no jurisdiction over this matter. Plaintiff’s only option 
is to appeal within the state court system.”). 
131  The pro se-education function of remand precedent appears more urgent in the light of data 
suggesting that between twenty-five and thirty-seven percent of federal civil litigants appear 
pro se. See Melodee C. Rhodes, Comment, The Battle Lines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a)(2) and the Effects on a Pro Se Litigant’s Ability to Survive a Motion to Dismiss, 22 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 527, 531–32 (2010). 
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status on the self-serving justification that such disputes involve lengthy consid-
eration of a factual record, rather than complex or novel legal questions.132  
Opinions not eligible for appellate review may also be seen as less fit for 
public consumption. This consideration applies most forcefully to remand orders 
because the jurisdictional statute prevents appellate review of district court deci-
sions to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.133 The same provision has 
been held to bar district courts from reconsidering their own remand orders.134 
In addition to Congress’s foreclosure of appeal, the judicially-created pre-
sumption against jurisdiction in removed cases helps curb the number of cases 
proceeding in the federal courts.135 The Supreme Court endorsed strict construc-
tion of the remand statute,136 relying on the Congressional purpose in the 1887 
                                                        
132  See generally JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: 
AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS (1987). By contrast, business litigation, in-
cluding antitrust and securities appeals, more frequently receive oral argument and published 
opinions in the federal courts of appeals, owing to their supposed legal complexity. See Pether, 
supra note 14, at 1438–39, 1505–07 (articulating ways in which “the practices of private judg-
ing in the U.S. courts have had the systematic effect of disadvantaging the powerless, the 
marginalized, and the ‘one-shotter,’ of whom the paradigm . . . is the pro se prisoner litiga-
tor.”). 
133  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). 
134  See, e.g., In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1996); Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box. 
Bd. Co., 609 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1979) (“Unquestionably, the statute not only forecloses 
appellate review, but also bars reconsideration of such order by the district court.”). But cf. 
Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 729 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding district court’s 
denial of motion to reconsider remand and upholding the district court’s jurisdiction to do so 
before sending a certified copy of the remand order to the state court); Order, Agner v. Shapiro, 
2:08-cv-00620 (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2009) (denying reconsideration of remand order on the mo-
tion’s merits without considering the procedural bar to reconsideration). 
135  The fee-shifting provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) further adds to the pressure 
against removal jurisdiction. This subsection permits district courts to order defendants to pay 
plaintiffs’ costs in defending “baseless” removals. Notably, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) “is 
not a sanctions rule; it is a fee-shifting statute, entitling the district court to make whole the 
victorious party.” Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, 
removals carry the possibility of fee-shifting, even if they otherwise satisfy Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are in good faith. 
136  28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012). 
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amendments.137 Circuit Courts have cited significant federalism concerns justi-
fying the strict construction and the presumption against jurisdiction.138 This pre-
sumption further tips the scale toward remand in doubtful and debatable cases,139 
                                                        
137  See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941) (“[T]he language 
of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts on removal, but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction 
of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation.”). 
138  E.g., Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme 
Court’s command that federal courts must exercise jurisdictional restraint is perhaps even 
more compelling in the context of removal than in the context of original jurisdiction.”); Car-
penter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 365–66 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause the 
effect of removal is to deprive the state court of an action properly before it, removal raises 
significant federalism concerns [and requires strict construction].”); Mulcahey v. Columbia 
Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Because removal jurisdiction raises 
significant federalism concerns, we must strictly construe removal jurisdiction.”); see also 
Adams v. Aero Servs. Int’l, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. Va. 1987) (“Removal of civil 
cases to federal court is an infringement on state sovereignty.”); Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 
109 (“Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate 
federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise 
limits which the statute has defined.” (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934))). 
139  See, e.g., Giles v. Chi. Drum, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985–88 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (explain-
ing the application of the Grable standard for the exercise of federal jurisdiction); In re Hot-
Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A]ny doubt about the propriety of removal must 
be resolved in favor of remand . . . .”); Lorenz v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 211 F. App’x 242, 
245 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A]mbiguities are construed against removal because the removal statute 
is strictly construed in favor of remand.”); In re Baby C v. Price, 138 F. App’x 81, 83 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (noting the presumption against removal jurisdiction and that “doubtful cases must 
be resolved in favor of remand”); Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151 (“If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, 
a remand is necessary.”); Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993) (doubts 
about removal are resolved in favor of remand); In re Bus. Men’s Assurance Co. of Am., 992 
F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993) (“The district court was required to resolve all doubts about 
federal jurisdiction in favor of remand.”); Gaus v. Miles Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in 
the first instance.”); Cheshire v. Coca-Cola Bottling Affiliated, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 
(D.S.C. 1990) (“If federal jurisdiction is in doubt, such doubt must be resolved in favor of state 
court jurisdiction and the case remanded.”); cf. Hartman v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 789 F. 
Supp. 2d 701, 703 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (“[F]raudulent joinder claims are subject to a rather 
black-and-white analysis in this circuit. Any shades of gray are resolved in favor of remand. 
At bottom, a plaintiff need only demonstrate a ‘glimmer of hope’ in order to have his claims 
remanded.”); Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425–26 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that, in fraudulent joinder analysis on removal, “there need be only a slight possibility of a 
right to relief. Once the court identifies this glimmer of hope for the plaintiff, the jurisdictional 
inquiry ends.” (citation omitted)). But see McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 
955 F.2d 924, 927 (4th Cir. 1992) (warning against “assuming that there is something inher-
ently bad about removal and ‘defeating’ the plaintiff’s choice of forum” and explaining that, 
“[t]o the contrary, by providing for removal in the first place, Congress seems to believe that 
the defendant’s right to remove a case that could be heard in federal court is at least as im-
portant as the plaintiff’s right to the forum of his choice”); id. (“Rather than favoring plaintiffs 
or defendants, . . . the removal procedure is intended to be ‘fair to both plaintiffs and defend-
ants alike.’ ” (quoting and affirming district court opinion, McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of May-
land. Cmty. Coll., 713 F. Supp. 185, 189 (W.D.N.C. 1989))). See generally Scott R. Haiber, 
Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 637 (2004). 
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and remand structurally demands less written reasoning. Practically speaking, 
presumption tips the balance away from producing written, reasoned elabora-
tions, and 1447(c)’s foreclosure of appeal puts a thumb on the scale. It seems an 
increasingly bad investment of scarce time to write an opinion when the outcome 
is more easily reached and will never see an appeal.  
Appellate review offers an avenue for a few submerged district court opin-
ions to emerge in Westlaw, but often with little effect on publicizing reasoning 
or on the volume of opinions that remain submerged. For example, in Wetlands 
Board v. Ware, the district court issued an eight-page memorandum opinion re-
manding a state zoning petition that allegedly raised substantial federal questions 
about the Clean Water Act and a federal injunction.140 In its submerged opinion, 
the district court elaborates on its conclusion that the federal injunction does not 
present a substantial question, citing nine cases and several statutory provi-
sions.141 The defendant appealed and the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished (and 
therefore non-precedential) opinion, available in Westlaw, properly dismissed 
the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, barred by § 1447(c) from consider-
ing any of the federal-question analysis below.142 
This study found that appellate decisions reached submerged trial court opin-
ions less frequently than they review conventionally-available opinions. This 
may result partly from the substantive law applied and the fact that jurisdictional 
remands are not appealable,143 while decisions to exercise removal jurisdiction 
are. But it also suggests that the theoretical availability of appellate review does 
not fully solve the problem of submerged precedent. 
II.  
CHARTING A COURSE: WHY SUBMERGED PRECEDENTS MATTER 
These observations beg the question whether we should care about district 
court opinions submerged from our view and obscured from future considera-
tion. Connecting submerged precedent to precedent theory and the unique insti-
tutional features of district courts reveals several reasons to care deeply. First, 
submerged precedents contain reasoned elaborations, the hallmark of precedent 
theory. Reasoned elaborations from district courts play an important role in prec-
edent doctrine, often ignored by appellate-centric precedent theory. Next, sub-
merged precedent highlights the heterogeneity in trial court decision-making and 
district courts’ distinctive contributions to the body of interpretive law. Due to 
their hierarchical position as original filing courts, district courts often produce 
                                                        
140  Mem. Order & Op., Wetlands Bd. v. Ware, 4:08-cv-00107 (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2009) (re-
printed in Appendix 2). 
141  Id. Notably, the court cites Merrell Dow for the embedded federal question standard and 
does not cite Grable, which was issued the year before the district court’s decision. 
142  Cty. of James City v. Rogers, 360 F. App’x 439, 441 (4th Cir. 2010) (dismissing appeal 
and stating that “because the district court’s remand was premised on its lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the district court’s order is not subject to review.”). 
143  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). 
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the first and only words on how to implement law and procedure. Ultimately, 
submerged precedent implicates the role information dissemination plays in 
shaping law.  
By mooring submerged precedent to these theoretical underpinnings and in-
stitutional considerations, this section highlights some of the value and unique-
ness of district court decisions—that is, the world of district court precedents.  
A. Hierarchy and the Hallmarks of Precedent 
District courts occupy a place in precedent hierarchy that is at once con-
straining and liberating. District courts first are constrained by hierarchy in that 
they are bound to follow the precedent of their circuit courts of appeal and the 
Supreme Court.144 Likely for this very good reason, much theoretical work on 
precedent focuses on the appellate courts, whose opinions formally bind numer-
ous trial courts, as well as the authoring appellate court itself.145  
By the same token, their inability to bind, vertically or horizontally, liberates 
district courts from the pressures and prioritization of making law for numerous 
others. District courts’ status at the origin of court hierarchy means that they de-
cide a multitude of different issues—some unappealable—and enjoy additional 
                                                        
144  See Dobbins, supra note 7. 
145  See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? 
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a 
Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 777–81 (1995); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis As a 
Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 73–78 (2001) (presenting historical cri-
tique of Eighth Circuit’s Anastasoff opinion on Circuit’s unpublished precedents); Martin 
Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 134 (1972). See generally, 
e.g., WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (2013) [hereinafter INJUSTICE ON APPEAL]; Ryan C. 
Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 
10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2013); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey 
Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994); Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of 
Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2014); Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention As a Scarce 
Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401 (2013); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and 
Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281 (1990); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent 
in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014); William L. Reynolds & William M. 
Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978); Adam N. Steinman, To 
Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1737 (2013). But cf. Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow 
Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 73–
80 (2015) (articulating arguments that federal district court interpretations of federal law 
should bind state courts in some instances); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encour-
age Settlement, and Why Permit Non-party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 221, 222, 222 n.6 (1999) (extolling “the public value of precedent” that may be circum-
vented at the district court level). 
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degrees of freedom in deciding whether to write reasoned elaborations for deci-
sions and what format or length to use.146 Though their opinions have only per-
suasive horizontal force, district court opinions still implicate the precedent sys-
tem’s animating principles: fairness, efficiency, and predictability.147  
District courts’ hierarchical status and institutional influences diverge mean-
ingfully from the appellate-precedent model. Yet, the core considerations of rea-
soning, relevance, and classification persist in the theory behind district court 
precedent. 
1. Reasons’ Virtues 
The first reason to care about submerged precedents is that they contain rea-
soning, the currency of a precedential system. A system of precedent employs 
past court decisions to inform resolution of current conflicts.148 Reasoned elabo-
ration separates opinions explaining a result (comprising 56 percent of the deci-
sions sampled in this study) from orders merely formalizing a result (44 percent 
of the sample).149 Although a decision’s result may offer some information about 
a preceding case,150 reasoned elaboration remains the hallmark of precedent and 
its doctrine. Reasoned elaborations serve the historical and abiding151 justifica-
tions for the precedential system: consistency, predictability, and legitimacy,152 
which are briefly surveyed here.  
                                                        
146  Many of the issues that district courts regularly decide never will be subjected to appellate 
review, and many of those that are reviewed vertically receive deferential standards of review, 
see discussion infra Part II.B. 
147  See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595–96, 599 (1987). 
148  See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 5–9 (1989) (summarizing the 
origins and evolution of the case-law system). 
149  See Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1327 (“From the lawyer’s perspective, the most visible role 
that judicial opinions play is that of being the raw material of precedent.”); Steinman, supra 
note 145, at 1792 (explaining that reasoning, rather than result, triggers stare decisis). See 
generally, Precedent BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining precedent as an ac-
tion or official decision that can be used as support for later actions or decisions; esp., “[a] 
decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or is-
sues.”). 
150  Levin, supra note 7 at 1041 (“[T]he existence of a precedent is a reason in itself for a court 
to hold one way or another.” (emphasis added)). 
151  See, e.g., Thomas Healy, supra note 145 (tracing the transfer of the British precedential 
system to the American colonies before and after the American Revolution); T. Ellis Lewis, 
History of Judicial Precedent, 46 L. Q. REV. 341 (1930). 
152  E.g. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 1 (2nd 
ed. 2013), http://www2.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Judicial-Writing-Manual-2D-FJC-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RZ2-83YE] (“Judicial opinions serve three functions. First, writ-
ten opinions communicate a court’s conclusions and the reasons for them to the parties and 
their lawyers. Second, when published, opinions announce the law to judges, academics, other 
lawyers, and the interested public. Finally, the preparation of a written opinion imposes intel-
lectual discipline on the author, requiring the judge to clarify his or her reasoning and assess 
the sufficiency of precedential support for it.”); see, e.g., Schauer, supra note 147, at 595–98. 
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Precedent’s prime directive to “[t]reat like cases alike,” stems from concepts 
of fairness and stability.153 Precedent provides an analytical rule which demands 
that judges treat like cases alike. “To fail to treat similar cases similarly, it is 
argued, is arbitrary, and consequently unjust or unfair.”154 Precedent doctrine ul-
timately can be viewed as a fairness doctrine, emphasizing consistency in adju-
dication and equality among similar cases.155 Transmission of reasoning enables 
consistent treatment of similar circumstances over time.  
If fairness is the most compelling among precedent’s justifications, then pre-
dictability and efficiency may be its most useful, and most used, ones.156 The 
predictability principle exists largely for the benefit of parties to litigation—or, 
with optimal predictability, folks who can successfully avoid becoming parties 
to litigation.157 The logic of predictability-through-precedent states that people, 
on their own or through their lawyers, can read past decisions to extract broadly-
applicable principles and analogous or distinctive factual considerations. These 
extracted principles enable people to predict how the law will apply to actions or 
                                                        
153  See Schauer, supra note 147, at 595. 
154  Id. at 595–96. 
155  See Levin, supra note 7, at 1049 (“[T]he equality justification [for precedent] is attractive 
because it offers a strong moral foundation for the doctrine.”). Note that it is simpler, of course, 
to treat identical cases alike. One would need only a minimum of relevant information about 
the issue and facts of the prior case to prove identity, plus the outcome of the prior case to 
reach identical treatment. Reasoning has value in the more frequent situation of a similar, not 
identical case. 
156  Justice Holmes notably characterized the common-law system of precedents as “[t]he 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact.” O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). Justice Brandeis went further, posing that, “in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.” Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Moragne v. 
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (including “the desirability that the law 
furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with 
assurance against untoward surprise” among the “[v]ery weighty considerations” underlying 
stare decisis); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss 
It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 627 (1990) (unearthing the reasons for 
adhering to precedent, Judge Aldisert also highlighted the “predictability factor in law”); 
Thomas S. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. 
REV. 201, 235–37 (1965) (listing stability, protection of reliance, efficiency, and equality as 
values supporting the system of precedent). See generally Schauer, supra note 147, at 597–99. 
157  See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 145 (highlighting the “public value of precedent” is that 
“[p]recedent helps non-litigants shape their conduct”); H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Jus-
tice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS. L. REV. 431, 433 (1986) (“Judicial decisions . . . resolve the imme-
diate dispute between the parties [and] often provide some guidance for future conduct.”); 
Schauer, supra note 147, at 597 (“When a decisionmaker must decide this case in the same 
way as the last, parties will be better able to anticipate the future. The ability to predict what a 
decisionmaker will do helps us plan our lives, have some degree of repose, and avoid the 
paralysis of foreseeing only the unknown.”). 
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transactions they are considering and to make strategic decisions in the course of 
litigation.158 As Chad Oldfather observed: 
The greater clarity with which a court states the propositions that led it to its de-
cision, the greater the certainty with which those who wish to structure their af-
fairs in compliance with the law will be able to do so. The same applies to judges 
who must act in accordance with the law articulated in those opinions and to law-
yers who must make arguments and advise clients on the basis of them.159 
Reasoned elaboration enables a more accurate prediction and thus can en-
courage citizens’ reliance on past decisions to order their lives.160 
The efficiency justification follows similar logic, but focuses on conserva-
tion of judicial resources. The efficiency justification assumes that the judicial 
system functions more efficiently when judges are relieved of having to consider 
from scratch each decision they must make in the course of a case.161 For busy 
judges, precedent decisions provide ready-made legal analyses, as well as a di-
rective to rely on those analyses,162 and a quick means of communicating with 
counsel and fellow jurists.163  
                                                        
158  See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 950 (1979) (explaining how parties consider existing law 
in settling disputes); see also Clayton P. Gillette, The Path Dependence of the Law, in THE 
PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE 245 (Steven J. Burton, ed., 2000) (“Precedent . . . per-
mits the law’s subjects to predict the consequences of their conduct.”). 
159  Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1330–31. 
160  The phenomenon of submerged precedent adds to the very recent arguments in precedent 
theory championing reliance. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY 
L.J. 1459, 1469 (2013); Levin, supra note 7, at 1039. Hillel Levin extends the predictability 
principle to propose a “reliance approach” to ascertaining precedential value among horizontal 
precedents that resembles promissory estoppel. Id. at 1054 (Judicial decisions “generate un-
derstanding on the part of the governed . . . as to what is required of them,” and “[w]hen mem-
bers of society take action based on understandings generated from judicial opinions, those 
decisions generate reliance interests.”) He argues that public reliance on a past decision should 
be “the primary factor” for a court “deciding whether and when to adhere to [horizontal] prec-
edent.” Id. at 1039. Randy Kozel highlights ambiguities and ambivalence in arguments for 
protecting reliance interests on precedent. Id. at 1039–54 He has suggested using reliance in a 
prospective manner, defining precedent by reference to “forward-looking interest in managing 
the disruptive impacts of adjudicative change for society at large.” Id. at 1459. 
Levin’s reliance theory focuses on whether the public has relied on past decisions to de-
termine a precedent’s use in a current analysis. Submerged precedent instead focuses on im-
proving the body of law on which the public may rely in developing litigation strategy. I favor 
a broad and reflectively diverse pool of decisions from which to draw precedent. Which deci-
sions from that pool ultimately emerge as bases for future decisions depends on the chance 
factors of factual variation, advocates’ skill, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
original decision as written. 
161  See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921); Levin, 
supra note 7 at 1047 (“[T]he doctrine of precedent allows judges to conserve judicial resources 
rather than to constantly reinvent the wheel.”). 
162  Schauer, supra note 147, at 599. 
163  Shapiro, supra note 145 (“[A]ppellate courts and the lawyers that serve them spend an 
overwhelming proportion of their energies in communicating with one another, and that the 
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Of course the efficiency rationale has some counterweights. First, the crea-
tion of precedent—through opinion writing—consumes judicial resources of the 
authoring judge, which may prove inefficient in that case, even if it will create 
decisional rules or templates useful to future cases.164 Second, reliance on past 
opinions can create undesirable path-dependence and inefficiency if those past 
decisions themselves announce or promote undesirable rules or faulty anal-
yses.165 But the efficiency rationale focuses on aggregate efficiency and largely 
disregards the desirability or correctness of the rules creating reliance.166 
The efficiency rationale acquires particular urgency at the district court level. 
District courts, on the front lines of litigation, see the highest volume of cases 
and the broadest set of issues within each case.167 Appellate decisions offer the 
most efficiency with their ability to bind vertically and thereby set rules for nu-
merous courts with a single writing. But the relative sparsity of appellate court 
opinions leaves plenty of decisional work for district courts to do without binding 
guidance, as discussed below in Part II.B. District courts’ prior opinions offer 
some efficiency horizontally by establishing possible templates for numerous le-
gal and factual issues of first impression and supplying non-binding reasoning 
for other district judges to consider when faced with a similar issue.  
Fairness and efficiency values contribute to the third justification for the 
precedent system: perceptions of judicial legitimacy. Precedent as a constraint 
on judicial decision-making is meant to bolster public confidence in the judiciary 
by signaling both neutrality in the judicial process and theoretical consistency in 
the outcomes of that process.168 The assumed neutrality, consistency, and effects 
                                                        
judicial opinion, itself conforming to the style of stare decisis, and then manipulated along 
with others according to the rules of stare decisis, is the principal mode of communication.”). 
164  See Lizotte, supra note 25, at 140; Oldfather, supra note 9 at 1317. 
165  See, e.g., Erie R. Co.. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (undoing nearly a century of 
federal common law in diversity cases based on “the more recent research of a competent 
scholar, . . . which established that the construction given to [the Rules of Decision Act] by 
the [prior] Court was erroneous”); Gillette, supra note 158 (explaining undesirable path-de-
pendence from precedent); see also Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 
(2012) (considering how elaboration on grants of summary judgment may contribute to a body 
of “losers’ rules”); Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, (Aug. 
20, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2651453 [https://perma.cc/G9T2-PZKL ] (exposing “os-
sification” of undesirable rules in international litigation precedents”). 
166  See Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Prece-
dent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1859, 1862 (2013). 
167  In contrast to the Circuit Courts of Appeal, who have some discretionary control over their 
workload and who answer a systematically-limited set of legal issues, district courts have con-
siderably less overt control of their dockets and are tasked with both fact-finding and law-
applying legal functions. 
168  See generally Levin, supra note 7, at 1044 (citing Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Lecutre, 
Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281 (1990)); Schauer, supra 
note 147, at 600. 
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on public confidence, remain unproven and riddled with problems.169 But the 
presence of reasons in past decisions and the imperative to explain current deci-
sions in terms of precedent are intended to prevent judges from deciding cases 
based on illegitimate personal preferences.  
Submerged precedent, within the confines of this study, appears to be a phe-
nomenon limited to district courts.170 As such, submerged precedent has only 
horizontal, or persuasive, force and does not bind other courts vertically.171 But 
the consistency, predictability, and legitimacy values still inure to district court 
reasoning and amplify its persuasive potential.172 Appellate courts may contrib-
ute to consistency across the district courts they bind, but internal consistency is 
just as important to district courts and district judges,173 and “[j]udges may find 
it inherently desirable,” from a consistency and legitimacy standpoint, “to find 
support in aspects of prior decisions even if they are not bound to do so.”174 Rea-
soning thus promotes fairness in adjudication, wherever it may be found. 
                                                        
169  Instances of tortured precedent to reach politically-charged results call attention to how 
selective use of precedent may be used to arrive at inconsistent or foolishly-consistent out-
comes. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Hillel Levin 
sums up the logical problem underlying the assumption of public confidence in consistency: 
“[W]hom would you likely trust more, the individual who admits to past mistakes or the one 
who insists that there have been none?” Levin, supra note 7, at 1046. And, as just noted, stare 
decisis demands consistency only for a particular district judge, not the whole district. 
170  See also McCuskey, supra note 8, at 436 (finding all relevant appellate opinions available 
on Westlaw). 
171  See Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1292, 1340 (“Trial court rulings . . . do not bind future 
courts in any strict sense.”). But see Caminker, supra note 145; Kozel, supra note 160; cf. 
Frost, supra note 145 (articulating arguments that federal district court interpretations of fed-
eral law should bind state courts in some instances). 
The only formally binding applications of district court precedent are claim or issue pre-
clusion, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (describing how claim and issue pre-
clusion prevent relitigation of certain claims or issues once decided by the trial court), and 
stare decisis within the same district, Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897, 900 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Stare decisis does not mandate that a district court in this circuit follow the 
decision of a district court in another circuit.”). “The district courts, like the courts of appeals, 
owe no obedience to the decisions of their counterparts in other districts, nor to the decisions 
of the courts of appeals in other circuits.” Id. at 901 (citing JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.402 (2d ed.1996)). 
172  Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1340 (Trial court opinions may “certainly serve as persuasive 
authority in any future court.”); see also Frost, supra note 145, at 80 (arguing that state courts 
should follow federal district court interpretations of federal law). 
173  Indeed, the “core idea of precedent ascribed to Article III . . . is simply that courts must 
start with their own precedent, even if there are varying ideas about the binding nature of that 
precedent.” See Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. 
REV. 81, 84 (2000) (emphasis added). 
174  Steinman, supra note 145, at 1772 (explaining further that “judges may believe their opin-
ions will be better received (by whatever audience) if they can invoke and claim consistency 
with non-binding aspects of prior decisions”). Similarly, at the individual-litigant level, rea-
son-giving even in interim decisions may confer on the losing party a sense of legitimacy for 
that loss. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the 
Search for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 58 n.102 (2002) (identifying a 
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2. Submerged Precedent’s Vices 
Reasoning animates precedent doctrine’s central virtues of fairness, effi-
ciency, and legitimacy. Effectively removing reasoned elaborations from consid-
eration in future cases thus threatens those virtues. The phenomenon of sub-
merged precedent, then, may influence future use of reasoning by making some 
opinions widely available and others practically invisible to all but the instant 
parties. In other words, submerged precedents could frustrate those navigating 
the civil justice system and disrupt the system itself.175 As Penelope Pether most 
memorably and forcefully argued, “private judging,” which selectively removes 
some adjudications from the body of precedent, creates “scandal” in a system 
ostensibly committed to equality in adjudication.176  
 As a threat to fairness, submerged precedent obscures the ability to deter-
mine whether judges actually are treating like cases alike, as well as a judge’s 
ability to determine whether courts previously have decided a case like the one 
before her. Further, judges potentially can get away with inconsistent adjudica-
tion, whether intentional or unintentional, when they submerge some reasoning 
and make other reasoning accessible.177 The obscurity of submerged precedents 
prevents development of effective policies to deal with any resulting inequities. 
Having only a portion of past reasoning effectively accessible therefore impli-
cates the normative principle of consistency.  
Potential erosion of consistency, in turn, threatens predictability and legiti-
macy. Submerged precedent may thwart predictability because precedent opin-
ions are the data litigants (through their lawyers) use to make those predic-
tions.178 The creation of precedent enhances the predictive power for parties and 
their lawyers. Leaving aside the individual lawyer’s skill, a prediction of the cor-
rect outcome is accurate only to the extent that the underlying data are reliable. 
So, the reasoning of precedent cases factors into the accuracy of any predic-
tion.179  
                                                        
judicial perspective that “justice requires that the losing party is entitled, in the very least, to 
an explanation as to why she has come out on the short end”). 
175  See Pether, supra note 14, at 1486 (arguing that “unpublication . . . obscures inconsistent 
treatment of similarly situated litigants [and] raises fundamental questions about the U.S. doc-
trine of precedent,” while noting that those fundamental questions remained “beyond the scope 
of her article.”). 
176  Id. 
177  Granted, supplying reasoning in some cases (opinions) and not in others (orders) also 
threatens an imbalance. But decisions which engender reasoned elaborations seem more 
“alike” than those fit for simple orders. 
178  See Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1328. 
179  McCuskey, supra note 8, at 397; cf. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 
202 (1988) (emphasizing, in crafting a rule for appellate jurisdiction, the importance of 
“preservation of operational consistency and predictability in the overall application of” the 
rule). And predictability most directly characterizes “easy” cases. Cf. Schauer, supra note 119, 
at 409 (offering as one measure for “easy” cases those “decisions seemingly compelled by the 
application of relatively settled doctrines”). 
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Beyond predictability for future parties and constraint on future decision-
makers, precedents can contribute incrementally to the development and clarifi-
cation of the law itself. A court’s explanation when implementing and applying 
legal rules plays an important role in promoting clarity—or at least consistency—
through clarification of doctrine.180 There can be value in having many courts 
consider an issue over a range of scenarios before announcing a wide-ranging 
precedent, as reflected in the Supreme Court’s certiorari process.181  
Precedent thus confers benefits on the public.182 If precedent is categorized 
as a public good with a public, predictive purpose,183 then it would seem that the 
precedent system should be as free as possible from pressures discouraging both 
the generation of reasoned opinions and their availability for use in prediction. 
When adjudicating disputes, courts are building law. The submergence of rea-
soned elaborations on the law could skew the law’s development in unintended 
and undesirable ways.184 
Certainly some of the submerged opinions in this sample are in “easy” cases, 
which, by definition, make minimal contributions to substantive law, at best. 
From a legitimacy perspective, however, reasoned elaboration in the “easy” 
cases bolsters systemic goals. First, what may seem mechanical to a seasoned 
jurist may not be so apparent to the parties or their lawyers. Second, the perceived 
legitimacy of our civil justice system flows from its treatment of both hard cases 
and easy cases. While reasoned elaborations “serve only imperfectly to ensure 
that judicial decisions are legitimate in the sense of being based in appropriate 
authority,” they still “provide some such assurance”185 in individual cases. Over 
time, the collection of decisions can trace aggregate consistency and legiti-
macy.186 
Precedent, and especially public reasoning by jurists, further preserves the 
rule of law and bolsters judicial legitimacy.187 If reasoned elaborations are kept 
effectively private between the authoring judge and the instant parties, the judge 
                                                        
180  McCuskey, supra note 8, at 397. 
181  Though incremental development of precedent also may create undesirable path-depend-
ence. 
182  Lederman, supra note 145, at 256 n.226. (“The public interest in preserving the work prod-
uct of the judicial system should always at least be weighed in the balance before such a motion 
[vacatur] is granted.” (alteration in original) (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushibi Kaishi 
v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 41 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
183  See id at 227 (“public resources are used to provide courts—and a court’s opinion serves 
as precedent—a public good”). 
184  See id. 
185  Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1335. 
186  See id. at 1336 (“By looking at a court’s performance over time, observers can determine 
whether the court really has treated like cases alike.”). 
187  Pether, supra note 14, at 1483–84 (explaining the “rule of law” problems with private 
judging). 
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releases herself from the “discipline” of airing her reasoning for critique and 
erodes her accountability for that reasoning.188 
Publicly-available opinions also enhance social perceptions of civil justice 
as legitimate. Assessing litigants’ satisfaction with their case outcomes depends 
largely on their impression of the process by which the justice system reaches 
those outcomes.189 When a court makes a decision and offers its reasoning, it can 
contribute to the parties’ satisfaction that they have had their “day in court.”190 
And a reasoned elaboration can provide legitimacy not just for the parties seeking 
the decision, but for posterity as well.  
The fairness, efficiency, and predictability values constrain interpretive law 
in a precedential system, allowing it to proceed incrementally, analogizing, dis-
tinguishing, and honing reasoning and rules of law through repeated application 
in evolving circumstances.191 The doctrine of precedent thus percolates substan-
tive law over the simmering heat of time and circumstance. While reasoning an-
imates precedent’s essential values and hierarchy constrains them, only time de-
termines these values’ evolution.192 
3. Problems with Prospective Classification 
Precedent’s essence lies in its potential future utility, transmitted through 
reasoned elaborations.193 A decision’s precedential potential exists at the mo-
ment it is entered on a docket with accompanying reasoning. But its true prece-
dential power—persuasive or binding—is realized only in hindsight, as an opin-
ion becomes legally and factually relevant in a future case.194 In light of the 
                                                        
188  Id. at 1441, 1483 (“[T]he practices of private judging in the courts imperil the legitimacy 
of the judicial system and thus the rule of law.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the 
Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 
768 (1983). 
189  See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 242 (1988); see also Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1336–37 (citing Tom R. Tyler, Citizen 
Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 882–83 (1997) and Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Con-
nected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 820–26 (2001)). 
190  See Ackerman, supra note 174, at 58 (“Employed properly, litigation can have a therapeu-
tic effect on the community.”); Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1337 (“By providing a reasoned 
explanation for its decision, a court will, at a minimum, give the parties a basis for concluding 
that, whether they won or lost, each side received an appropriate hearing of their grievances.”). 
191  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–38 (1986) (describing the development of 
precedent as analogous to writing a chain-novel). 
192  See generally, Black & Spriggs, supra note 145; Re, supra note 145.  
193  Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366–67 
(1978). 
194  See Precedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF 
MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 288 (3d ed. 1914) (“In law a precedent is an adjudged 
case or decision of a court of justice, considered as furnishing a rule or authority for the deter-
mination of an identical or similar case afterwards arising, or of a similar question of law.”); 
Dobbins, supra note 7, at 1460 (highlighting the relevance dimension to precedent); see also 
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retrospective nature of precedential value, advocates have fought fiercely to pre-
vent the courts of appeal from designating their opinions as prospectively non-
citable, or non-precedential.195 Removing judicial opinions—especially appel-
late ones—from the body of accessible precedent has been forcefully cast as “pri-
vate judging,” scandalizing our public system of precedent.196  
At the district court level, submerged precedent presents a more lurking 
problem of prospective classification. Submergence obscures the process of 
precedent and the law itself. Submerging a reasoned decision on a docket serves 
as an instantaneous decision (conscious or not) about whether that reasoning may 
be considered in the future at all. Confining an opinion to its docket effectively 
classifies that opinion at the moment it is issued as beyond future consideration, 
but does so invisibly and effectively prevents access to that reasoning, not just 
use of it.  
Prospective classification poses problems in a system that defines its prece-
dents not only hierarchically, but practically and retrospectively.197 While an 
opinion’s place in the hierarchy of vertical precedents is set at the time of writing, 
its applicability and merit emerge only over a lifetime.198 The events, scenarios, 
and developments in future cases that render an opinion analogous, distinct, and 
persuasive from a consistency perspective cannot be appreciated fully at the mo-
                                                        
Lederman, supra note 145, at 221 n.3 (defining “precedent” as “case law that can influence a 
later decision in the same court or a lower court”). Precedent enjoys a dual grammatical life—
as an adjective and a noun. While “precedent” the adjective describes the system of common 
law and statutory interpretation produced through reliance on certain past decisions, “prece-
dent” the noun refers to those decisions themselves. Compare Precedent, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “precedent,” adjective, as “Preceding in time or order”), 
with id. (defining “precedent,” noun, as “1. The making of law by a court in recognizing and 
applying new rules while administering justice [and] 2. [a] decided case that furnishes a basis 
for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues.”). Precedent the noun is the prod-
uct of the precedential system and the currency within that system. See Schauer, Precedent, 
supra note 147, at 571 (“An appeal to precedent is a form of argument, and a form of justifi-
cation . . . .”). 
195  Although the federal appellate courts for a time used un-publication as a prohibition on 
precedential power and use, the revision to Federal Appellate Rule 32 clarifies that publication 
is now a plus-factor, not a prerequisite to citation precedential value. See FED. R. APP. P. 
32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, 
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been . . . designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not 
for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like . . . after January 1, 2007.”). 
But see Keele et al., supra note 27, at 218 (noting studies finding that published and un-
published opinions “do not vary in precedential value”). 
196  Pether, supra, note 14, at 1436. 
197  See Gillette, supra note 158, at 245 (exploring the “assumption . . . that precedent is pri-
marily a retrospective doctrine”); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (1974). 
198  See Pether, supra note 14, at 1519 (surveying critiques of prospective classification in 
appellate opinions). 
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ment of writing, or even shortly afterward. Thus, classifying an opinion as po-
tential “precedent” or “not” at the time of writing short-circuits the evolutionary 
character of the precedential system.199  
In the federal appellate courts, the authoring judge’s or judges’ ex ante la-
beling is obvious, consequential, and hotly debated. The labels “published” and 
“unpublished” reflect some vestigial practical justifications with doctrinal impli-
cations, as discussed below.200 In the federal appellate courts, the public can see 
all opinions and cite to them, though the circuits maintain control over an opin-
ion’s usage, based on its publication status. “Unpublication,” in Penelope 
Pether’s appellate lexicon, “means that an opinion is not designated for publica-
tion in the jurisdiction’s official reporter . . . ; to a greater or lesser extent it makes 
the opinion difficult to find; it limits or destroys the precedential value of the 
opinion.”201  
When circuit courts restricted parties’ ability to cite unpublished opinions 
available in the Federal Appendix and in Westlaw, it ignited a firestorm,202 cul-
minating in a revision to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1.203 But this 
battle left undisturbed the circuit courts’ ability to label prospectively a decision 
as “precedential” or “not” at the time it is issued.204 The comparisons between 
precedential and non-precedential labeled decisions may, at times, be madden-
ing.205 But at least we know enough to be outraged.  
Prospective classification in the federal district courts, however, is an even 
more opaque process that has gone mostly unnoticed and unscrutinized. Even 
                                                        
199  And it creates decisions beyond the reach of the systemic imperative to treat like cases 
alike. See, e.g., Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (la-
menting that “an unpublished opinion … preserves [the appellate court’s] ability to change 
course in the future”). 
200  See infra, Part III.A. 
201  Pether, supra note 14, at 1437; see also William R. Mills, The Shape of the Universe: The 
Impact of Unpublished Opinions on the Process of Legal Research, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
429, 429 (2003). 
202  See, e.g., Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions As Precedent, 55 
HASTINGS L. J. 1235, 1235–36 (2004); Michael B.W. Sinclair, Anastasoff Versus Hart: The 
Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential Authority to Circuit Court Decisions, 
64 U. PITT. L. REV. 695 (2003); Stephanie Francis Cahill, Don’t Issue Citations for Citations: 
Court Committee: Courts Should Allow Citing Unpublished Opinions, A.B.A. J. EREPORT 
(Dec. 13, 2002), http://www.nonpublication.com/DONTISSUE.htm [https://perma.cc/BQ8T-
XT8Y]; see also Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1285. Compare Anastasoff v. United States, 223 
F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (2000) (holding Circuit Court Rules 
denying precedential value to unpublished decisions violated the Constitution), with Hart v. 
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding constitutionality of the Ninth Circuit’s 
rule prohibiting citation and denying precedential value to unpublished decisions). 
203  FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (permitting citation to unpublished decisions issued on or after Jan-
uary 1, 2007). 
204  See, e.g., Richman, supra note 4, at 1724; see also, e.g., INJUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 
145, at 79–80. 
205  See, e.g., Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing use of the “non-precedential” label); Gant, supra, note 71 at 705; Liptak, supra note 3. 
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though they may elevate some opinions’ status by designating them as “pub-
lished” in the Federal Reporter, district judges do not label their opinions as 
“precedential” or “not” like appellate judges do; the published/unpublished dis-
tinction does not have the same effect.206 Though this label-free treatment of 
opinions at the district court may seem more egalitarian, it instead obscures a 
prospective classification process that effectively removes one class of opinions 
from public view and thereby prevents any citation to or consideration of those 
opinions. Submerged precedents represent the “non-precedential” classification 
at the district-court level—without such obvious labeling. Submerged precedent 
thus implicates both transparency in decision-making and the systemic directive 
to treat like cases alike.207 
It is quite likely that the submergence of many district court opinions results 
from a far less conscious sorting process than that of forced labeling at the ap-
pellate level.208 Yet there remains the mismatch of prospective decisions about 
an opinion’s future availability as precedent and precedent doctrine’s emphasis 
on evolution and situational application.  
The effective inability to use certain district court opinions as precedent may 
seem less pernicious both because those opinions cannot bind in a vertical sense 
and because some opinions ultimately may receive appellate review. Yet district 
court opinions serve vital functions in the precedent system, and the inability to 
even compare those restricted opinions from the available ones is possibly even 
more troubling because it has prevented debate.  
B. Value in District Court Precedent 
While reasoned elaboration has its own value serving precedents’ normative 
goals, district court opinions make some unique contributions to the body of 
precedent and the processes in a precedential system. In the spaces where no 
appellate guidance exists or is likely to exist, district courts effectively generate 
the law in an important, if informal way. District judges’ expertise and leadership 
on trial-court issues can enhance the persuasive power of their precedents. And 
district court decisions play a crucial role in implementing law. For these reasons, 
submerging district court opinions may rob the system of more value than their 
hierarchical status would suggest.  
                                                        
206  The evolution of the terms “published” and “unpublished” for district court opinions par-
alleled appellate courts. But district courts did not have citation restriction rules for tradition-
ally “unpublished” opinions—either before or after the commercial services acquired elec-
tronic capabilities and migrated to remote access. See generally Joseph L. Gerken, A 
Librarian’s Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 L. LIBR. J. 475, 478 (2004); So dis-
trict courts’ “unpublished” opinions effectively became citable the moment they became avail-
able. 
207  See Price, supra note 173, at 83 (identifying these two values “at stake in the work of 
appellate courts”). 
208  See supra Part I.C. 
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1. Issues Isolated from Appeal 
Civil litigation calls on district courts to decide a multitude of legal issues, 
memorialized in a variety of forms on a continuum of formality: published opin-
ions, unpublished opinions, orders, oral statements, and letters to the parties. In 
the course of a single litigation, a district court may be called on to decide nu-
merous motions on varied issues, from the dispositive (like summary judgment) 
to the mundane (like motions for extension of deadlines). District courts thus 
make hundreds of thousands of decisions each year,209 not all of which warrant 
reasoned elaboration.  
The realities of dispute-resolution coupled with the strictures of appellate 
jurisdiction ensure that some large portion of district courts’ decisions will not 
receive appellate review.210 Mootness and standing doctrines prevent appellate 
review in several common scenarios: settlement, judgment in favor of an interim 
motion’s loser, or judgment against an interim motion’s winner.211 For example, 
a district court may deny a defendant’s motion for summary judgment and pro-
ceed to trial. If the defendant goes on to win in the final judgment, he ordinarily 
has no standing to appeal the summary judgment denial.212 If instead, the defend-
ant reaches a settlement with plaintiff before trial, he moots an appeal.213  
                                                        
209  The Administrative Office of the Federal Courts does not track the number of motions 
filed or decided. But a low estimate of court decisions on motions is based on the available 
data on case dispositions. The federal district courts saw 238,646 private civil cases com-
menced, Table C-1: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending 
During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2012, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2012/03/31 
[https://perma.cc/JBC2-7GHN] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). Of the 288,151 civil cases termi-
nated in the federal district courts in the year spanning April 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012, a total 
of 233,142 were terminated by court action. Table C-4: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases 
Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 
31, 2012, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics/2012/03/31 [https://perma.cc/CWP7-X49E] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). Thus, the 
district courts must make some decisional action in over 200,000 cases per year. More likely, 
the courts exceed this number of decisions before disposition. 
210  See Peter W. Martin, Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Dig-
ital Age, 53 VILL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2008) (“Important legal questions can recur in litigation nu-
merous times without being appealed.”). 
211  See generally, 19-205 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 205.02[2] (3d. ed. 1999); 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3902 (2d ed. 1987). 
212  Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333–34 (1980) (“Ordinarily, only a party 
aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statutory right to appeal 
therefrom.”). 
213  See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(settlement in which plaintiff relinquishes all claims moots appeal, even despite parties’ sepa-
rate agreement to press appeal of district court’s personal jurisdiction ruling). 
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The final judgment rule further protects many interim decisions from ap-
peal,214 particularly when the party aggrieved by that decision has little motiva-
tion to contest it after final judgment.215 This is particularly true of interim dis-
covery decisions, like denials of motions for protective orders holding requested 
documents not protected by a privilege.216 A district court’s denial of privilege 
protection is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.217 
While appellate review technically exists,218 required disclosure gives an adver-
sary access to the information in the meantime.219  
So the interim nature of many district court decisions practically prevents 
many of them from receiving appellate review. Some formal obstacles may fur-
ther prevent review, such as the statutory insulation from appeal for jurisdictional 
remands.220 These forces deprive the appellate courts of some opportunities to 
generate binding precedent on numerous procedural issues. Particularly on in-
terim issues of discovery and procedure, district court precedent is the only guid-
ance that exists.  
2. Dissemination by District Courts 
“The link between courts and the public is the written word. With rare ex-
ceptions, it is through judicial opinions that courts communicate with litigants, 
lawyers, other courts, and the community.”221 While not formally binding, dis-
trict court opinions can play a crucial role in shaping law by disseminating it.222 
As trial courts, district courts are tasked with implementing law and explaining 
                                                        
214  28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
215  The collateral order doctrine and 28 U.S.C. § 1292 certification procedure capture rela-
tively few of these interim decisions for review and are not reliably available. See Bryan Lam-
mon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 423, 
452 (2013). 
216  See 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3914.23 (2d 
ed. 1991). 
217  Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 114 (2009). 
218  Id. at 110. (“In our estimation, postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights 
of litigants and ensure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege. Appellate courts can remedy 
the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other 
erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial 
in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.”). 
219  See id; see also Lammon, supra note 215, at 458. 
220  See supra Part I.D.2. (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)’s foreclosure of appeal for jurisdic-
tional remands, while preserving for appeal those decisions exercising jurisdiction). 
221  FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 152, at vii. 
222  Cf. Joan M. Shaughnessy, Unpublication and the Judicial Concept of Audience, 62 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1597 (2005) (explaining, generally, the range of audiences who read judicial 
opinions). 
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what appellate opinions mean for litigants in real situations, as well as future 
parties.223  
Some district judges may speak more forcefully than others in this role and 
may transcend their formal place in the precedent hierarchy by virtue of their 
outsized experience on certain issues, or simply by getting the first crack at novel 
issues and the most opportunities to opine on longstanding ones. And district 
court opinions attract numerous citations, despite their inability to formally 
bind.224 
Some individual district court judges may attain a prominence that attracts 
deference (or at least additional attention) from practitioners, fellow district 
judges, and appellate courts. Expertise, experience, and willingness to raise the 
profile and ambit of their decisions amplifies the influence of these prominent 
trial-court judges and extends the reach of their writings.225 The written opinions 
of high-profile judges establish a kind of “super” district court presence with 
heightened power to persuade intra-district, inter-district, and up the appellate 
hierarchy.226 When these judges speak, they have a larger audience, and the rea-
soning issued in these super-precedents often carries farther, even if solely to be 
distinguished.227  
                                                        
223  See McCuskey, supra note 8, at 396. (articulating the role of district courts in clarifying 
doctrine). 
224  See Martin, supra note 210 (“Decisions of the U.S. District Courts, including many not 
published in print, are widely cited and relied upon even though they are not binding prece-
dent.”). 
225  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 140–43 (1995) (highlighting utility con-
siderations in judges’ opinion-writing); Shaughnessy, supra note 222, at 1605. 
226  Other authors have examined the phenomenon of super precedent in the context of stare 
decisis in Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Superprecedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th 
ed. 2009); Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006); Wil-
liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976) (coining “superprecedent”); Michael Sinclair, Precedent, 
Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 363 (2007). William Eskridge has identified a 
similar phenomenon among “super-strong” statutory precedents. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (explaining that overruling 
precedents interpreting federal statutes may prove particularly difficult in part because those 
decisions may “enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness”). Super-strong statutory 
precedent describes courts’ increasingly deferential reliance on precedents of statutory inter-
pretation in contrast to regular common-law or constitutional precedents. See id. at 1366; see 
also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31–32 (1982) (highlight-
ing how judicial opinions may update anachronistic statutes). 
227  Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York offers a prominent example of 
district judge dissemination through super precedent, particularly on issues of aggregate liti-
gation and discovery. Judge Weinstein’s decisions have been cited with explicit notation of 
his authorship 98 times by district courts outside New York and 77 times by courts of appeals 
outside his Circuit. Calculated from a Westlaw Search in the ALLFEDS database for (“wein-
stein, j.” % AU(weinstein) % (weinstein /3 dissent!)). Judge Louis Pollak of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania attracted deference on trial-court issues, too. See, e.g., Plymovent Corp. 
v. Air Tech. Sols., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 139, 144 (D.N.J. 2007) (citing, with author notation, Judge 
Pollak’s unreported opinion in In re Painted Aluminum Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. CIV. A. 
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While these super-opinions by district judges are unlikely to remain sub-
merged on dockets, they reinforce the idea that district court opinions may dis-
seminate reasoning both vertically and horizontally. 
Submerged precedent threatens precedent doctrine’s core tenets of fairness, 
efficiency, and legitimacy by obscuring some reasoned elaborations, but making 
others easily accessible. The observation that submerged precedent appears con-
fined to the district-court level of the precedent hierarchy does little to diffuse 
these threats to the rule of law. 
III. BUOYING PRECEDENTS: TOWARD OPTIMAL SUBMERGED PRECEDENT 
Acknowledging that submerged precedent has the potential to skew the law, 
frustrate consistency, and erode legitimacy, this Part pursues an ideal ratio of 
submerged precedent, balancing justice and efficiency and capturing the value in 
district court opinions.  
Most urgently, submerged precedent requires attention to fulfill the statutory 
mandate in the E-Government Act of 2002.228 The Act requires free online public 
access to “the substance of all written opinions issued by the [federal courts in 
text-searchable format], regardless of whether such opinions are to be published 
in the official court reporter.”229 And, while the Act does not define “written 
opinions” further, submerged precedents as defined here fit the Judicial Confer-
ence’s definition.230 The Act does not specify what level of public access suf-
fices, but many of the submerged precedents identified in this sample are not 
“free” in the PACER database because they are not tagged as “written opinions.”  
Addressing the phenomenon of submerged precedent to fulfill the statutory 
mandate requires a conscious consideration of theory’s interaction with technol-
ogy—of the role that access to information has in serving our precedent system’s 
animating values. This Part considers technological, statutory, procedural, and 
existential ways to build a better iceberg, or better navigational tools.  
A. The E-Government Act of 2002 
Can we safely navigate district court precedent with better sonar? Is it 
enough to recognize submerged precedents’ existence, or must we gather com-
plete information about their size, shape, and position? The small sample in this 
                                                        
95-cv-6557, 1996 WL 397472 at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1996) as the relevant “case law” on the 
proper scope of interpretation for Rule 26(b)(4)(B)). And notations of prominent authors can 
be useful when highlighting important analyses distinct from the instant case. See, e.g., In re 
Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 65, 75 (D. Mass. 2006) (citing 
California v. Powrex Corp., Civ-S-05-01216, 2006 WL 997717 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2006) with 
the author notation “(Levi, J.)”). 
228  E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
229  Id. 
230  See supra Parts I and II. (defining “precedent” to include written opinions supported by 
reasoned elaboration, in keeping with the Judicial Conference’s definition). 
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study offers only the questions, not the answers. If the content and reasoning in 
the submerged body of opinions mirrors the available ones, then Westlaw has a 
representative sample and it may be both safe and efficient not to wade through 
the details of submerged precedents. But different samples based on different 
areas of law or procedural postures may offer different conclusions about repre-
sentativeness—or additional inconclusiveness, as described above.231 
We do not need empirical proof of skew to catalyze action, for Congress has 
already spoken and mandated access to all written opinions. The E-Government 
Act of 2002 already requires every federal district, appellate, and bankruptcy 
court to maintain a website with “[a]ccess to the substance of all written opinions 
issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in 
the official court reporter, in a text searchable format.”232  
While the federal courts have faithfully implemented the statutory directive 
and serve as models of public access, the ease and economy with which technol-
ogy has expanded access to precedents makes the persistence of submerged prec-
edents more disturbing. Congress appeared to require zero submergence thirteen 
years ago in the E-Government Act’s mandate for courts to make available to the 
public for free “all written opinions.”233 The phenomenon of submerged prece-
dent suggests that the mandate remains unfulfilled at the district court level in 
ways only now coming to light. Notably, the prospective classification of puta-
tive precedents—that vestige of a book-and-paper era—persists at some level 
through the Judicial Conference’s definition of “written opinions” as any “rea-
soned explanation”234 and the district courts’ application of this definition.235 Not 
all written decisions fitting the Conference’s definition are made publicly avail-
able for free. Some remain on dockets without the “written opinion” tag, and 
thereby also evade detection by the commercial electronic databases.236 
PACER revolutionized docket access and has achieved enormous success at 
implementing the directive of online electronic public access. Further, PACER 
has made all of the tagged “Written Opinions” available for free. Although all 
decisions are technically “available” and those “Written Opinions” so designated 
by the authoring court are also free, these distinctions suggest that the intent of 
that directive remains unfulfilled so long as some written opinions are not as 
available as other “Written Opinions” at the author’s discretion.  
                                                        
231  See supra Part I.C.2. 
232  E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
233  Id. 
234  Free Written Opinions, supra note 9. 
235  Cf. Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents to Data, Partic-
ulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 862 (2008) (“Improved access to the law as embodied 
in a court’s rulings in individual proceedings . . . by those having a desire to know and apply 
it was the apparent target [of the written opinions requirement].”) 
236  See supra Part I.A. 
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If access is the goal and a distinction among opinions’ classifications is ex-
pressly eschewed in implementing that goal, then maintaining any fee/free dis-
tinction seems illogical and inconsistent with the goal. Thus, in light of this Con-
gressional directive toward unclassified access to precedents, doing nothing is 
not an attractive option. That leaves doing everything or doing only something 
as viable courses of action. 
B. Zero Submergence 
Faced with uncertainty about skew but a Congressional directive toward 
availability, the safest course would be to proceed with full access to all opin-
ions—zero submergence. A zero-submergence solution has two obvious virtues 
in addition to fulfilling the Act’s mandate. First, it would be relatively easy to 
achieve, thanks to technological advances. Second, it would fully dismantle the 
vestigial prospective selection of potential precedents, untethering precedent 
doctrine from logistical concerns and inequitable effects of discretion.237 
Technology is both a solution to our remaining access problem, and its his-
torical source. Two centuries ago, the logistics of printing copies and dissemi-
nating them across a frontier landscape drove the decision to make available only 
a portion of those reasoned decisions issued by the federal courts.238 The printed, 
bound volumes of the Federal Reporter and Supplement could hold only so many 
printed pages. Based on this physical reality, only the opinions selected for pub-
lication in the reporters were widely available across the circuits.239 Those opin-
ions selected for dissemination in the reporters, by necessity, constituted the 
available precedent. Anyone searching for precedent would need access either to 
the courthouse or the books.  
Although technology initially created the published/unpublished caste sys-
tem for opinions, technology more recently has offered solutions to that problem 
by broadening the pool of available decisions and expanding public access to 
them. In the 1980s and 90s, Westlaw and Lexis began to diversify from print by 
storing case law in electronic databases capable of holding reported as well as 
unreported opinions.240 By the mid-1990s, one needed only paid access to the 
CD-ROMs to search through reported opinions and thousands of unreported 
ones. By 2000, the internet made those databases readily available remotely, with 
only a contract, login, and internet connection required to view hundreds of thou-
sands of opinions.241  
                                                        
237  See Pether, supra note 14 at 1535 (proposing that “[a]n alternative to stopping the practices 
of private judging would be to effectively publish all opinions”). Cf. Peter W. Martin, Aban-
doning Law Reports for Official Digital Case Law, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 25 (2011) 
(detailing state efforts in this vein). 
238  See Price, supra note 173, at 112. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. Note, however, that Westlaw is also the publisher of the Federal Supplement volumes. 
241  See Martin, supra note 210, at 9. 
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Thus, by the mid-1990s, the march of technology had rendered the term 
“published” versus “unpublished” a misnomer in all federal courts, and many 
state courts.242 The “publication” distinction now describes only which opinions 
are printed in the bound Reporter volumes and which are not.243 Although the 
federal appellate courts still maintain a precedential/non-precedential distinction 
based on a decision’s selection for publication in the Federal Reporter volumes, 
all “unpublished” opinions from the appellate courts are readily available to the 
public on the courts’ own websites, as well as in commercial services.244 The 
district courts have not tried to maintain a similar precedential distinction based 
on reporter inclusion or exclusion.245 
The federal courts themselves contributed mightily to public access to prec-
edent in establishing the electronic PACER system.246 The E-Government Act 
of 2002 mandated online public access to “the substance of all written opinions” 
by the federal courts in text-searchable format, “regardless of whether such opin-
ions are to be published in the official court reporter.”247 As implemented in 
PACER, only a login and internet connection are required to view all these stat-
utorily-protected “written opinions.”248 So the trend, certainly, has been for tech-
nology to democratize precedent over the past fifty years.  
And the federal courts have kept their foot on the gas. Pilot projects currently 
underway further collect and sort written opinions, available for free without a 
login, through the Government Printing Office’s Federal Digital System (FDSys) 
collection.249 Simultaneously, the Administrative Office has been rolling out the 
NextGen updates to the PACER system with significant improvements in func-
tionality, including the ability to conduct multi-jurisdictional searches from a 
                                                        
242  Id. at 33. 
243  See K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and The Role 
of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 398 (2001). “Reported” versus 
“unreported” would be a more accurate label pair under modern circumstances, but the “pub-
lished / unpublished” terms persist. 
244  And, as explained earlier, the precedential/non-precedential treatment remains hotly con-
tested, all the way to the Supreme Court. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Plumley v. Austin 
and its February 2015 coverage in the news media). 
245  See supra Part II.A.3. 
246  See generally Martin, supra note 235, at 860–61 (tracing PACER’s origins). 
247  E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
248  Free Written Opinions, supra note 9 (promoting the Judicial Conference definition for 
“written opinions” as any decision with accompanying “reasoned explanation”). 
249  See FDsys: United States Court Opinions, supra note 61. FDSys “provides free online 
access to official publications from all three branches of the Federal Government.” About 
FDsys, U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF., http://www.gpo.gov/fdsysinfo/aboutfdsys.htm [https://per 
ma.cc/RA87-J7D7] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
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single login portal.250 The federal courts originally built their electronic case fil-
ing system to benefit judges and court administrators, not parties or the public.251 
Thus many of the technological updates to those systems reflect management of 
the growing workload in the federal courts, rather than tracking doctrinal goals 
for precedent. And “keen observers of the legal information marketplace recog-
nize that the government has never performed well in the role of a legal pub-
lisher.”252  
Still, at least as the volume of precedents being generated has grown, so has 
our access to them.253 Based on the infrastructure built by PACER and the E-
Government Act, several smaller online collections of opinions recently have 
proliferated, offering quicker and/or cheaper alternatives.254 The table in Appen-
dix 3, below, briefly catalogues some of the most recent entrants to the market 
for online precedent and compares them to Westlaw and BloombergLaw. The 
results show a mixed bag of comprehensiveness, with Westlaw, FDSys, Bloom-
bergLaw Opinions, and Google Scholar clustered at the top for comprehensive-
ness.255 Because they are more accessible but less comprehensive than Westlaw, 
however, these limited collections appear unlikely to offer solutions to sub-
merged precedent.  
 This comparison suggests that none of these online services captures sub-
merged precedents, likely because the most comprehensive services still appear 
to draw almost entirely from PACER’s free collection of tagged “written opin-
ions.” Even FDSys, the GPO’s collection, maintains the same layer of editorial 
selection by drawing from those PACER opinions already tagged “written opin-
ion.”  
The diversification in online opinion access services has promise in theory. 
Practically, however, all the current services perpetuate submerged precedent, to 
                                                        
250  See Implementation of NextGen CM/ECF, PACER (Oct. 2014), https://www.pacer. 
gov/announcements/quarterly/qa201410.pdf [https://perma.cc/83ZS-B5KU] (highlighting 
NextGen implementation in the Second and Ninth Circuits). 
251  See Martin supra note 235 at 864 (explaining that the federal courts built electronic filing 
and document management systems to help judges and court personnel, though lawyers ben-
efitted from remote access to them). 
252  Mills, supra note 201, at 446. 
253  See, e.g., Martin, supra note 235 at 855 (citing the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts’ 2001 proclamation that, “[T]he advancement of technology has brought the citizen 
ever closer to the courthouse.”); 25 Years Later, PACER, Electronic Filing Continue to 
Change Courts, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/12/09/25-
years-later-pacer-electronic-filing-continue-change-courts [https://perma.cc/ZSQ3-FZP4]. 
254  These include Cornell’s Legal Information Institute, Leagle, Fastcase, Findlaw, Public Li-
brary of Law, Google Scholar, and the Law Library of Congress. See Researching Judicial 
Decisions, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/judicial-decisions.php#intro 
[https://perma.cc/3L9F-DKBD] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
255  But one comparison is stark: the highest number of Northern District opinions captured by 
any service over those nine years is 31 (FDSys), while only three years of results (2006–2008) 
from the same court incorporating submerged precedent produced 40 opinions. See infra Ap-
pendix 3. 
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some extent, as long as they draw their collections from the free federal PACER 
database, which permits pre-classification of opinions as available or submerged. 
Creating the best possible source data through PACER enables other collections 
to develop and evolve on a more solid foundation. Plus, a PACER-level solution 
augments implementation of Congress’s stated priority for public access and pro-
motes transparency.256  
The deeper question of discretion in availability persists as long as docket 
clerks or other humans associated with the author bear responsibility for sifting 
orders from opinions. A relatively easy technological solution would be to cap-
ture all orders, perhaps in a form, and make them all available, for free, in a 
collection. Or the federal courts could make available for free every decision 
above a certain word count to remove the opportunity for discretionary selec-
tion.257  
If all decisions were available for free in text-searchable format—and pref-
erably with search capabilities to filter by court, date, and keywords—then re-
searchers would have the full data set from which to identify those decisions that 
have sufficient reasoning and similarity to constitute precedents. And non-gov-
ernmental collections would have the full set of decisions from which to cull 
their particular subsets or access platforms. FDsys would be a particularly good 
platform for the zero-submergence collection because it already isolates opinions 
from mere docket entries.258 Additionally, FDSys’s advanced search functions 
allow users to text-search terms across all courts, as well as all other government 
authors, capturing case law, statutes, and regulations.259  
Similarly, Westlaw could change its collection policy to capture all decisions 
without editorial discretion.260 Chief among the merits of a zero-submergence 
                                                        
256  As the chief of staff for the Administrative Office’s Department of Program Services ob-
served in 2013: 
“Twenty-five years ago, the vast majority of cases were practically obscure. Today, every Third 
Branch court is using CM/ECF and PACER . . . . That means that all dockets, opinions, and case 
file documents can be accessed world-wide in real time, unless they are sealed or otherwise re-
stricted for legal purposes. This level of transparency and access to a legal system is unprecedented 
and unparalleled.” 
25 Years Later, supra note 253. 
257  One-hundred words might be a reasonable place to start. In Christina Boyd’s large study 
of opinion-writing using Westlaw data, the observation with the fewest words was 51. See 
Boyd, supra note 19, at Table 1 (listing minimum observation for “Opinion Length” variable 
as 51 words). 
258  And the table entitled “Comparison of Online Case Law Services” shown in Appendix 3, 
shows that FDSys had a slightly more comprehensive collection of opinions from the Northern 
District of Illinois. See infra Appendix 3. 
259  See Advanced Search, U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF., http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/ad 
vanced/advsearchpage.action [https://perma.cc/VW27-PJZU] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
260  Both Westlaw and Lexis profess to collect all decisions from PACER that are “substan-
tive”, excluding only “procedural orders.” See McCuskey, supra note 8, at 430 n.236 (recount-
ing correspondence with database representatives); see also Lizotte, supra note 25, at 134–35 
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solution through Westlaw is that the newly-expanded body of decisional law 
could be sifted with Westlaw’s more finely-tuned search fields and filters. The 
downsides of a Westlaw-based solution are the cost of a Westlaw subscription 
(which might increase if Westlaw had to pay PACER fees for additional opin-
ions) and the fact that Westlaw builds its database directly from PACER any-
ways.  
As a precedent purist, I favor the zero-submergence solution because it 
would create a public body of precedent, which includes all decisions bearing the 
hallmark of putative precedential value: reasoned elaboration. A zero-submerg-
ence collection of decisions would thereby release precedent theory from the lo-
gistical confines of discretionary pre-selection, the conscious or unconscious bi-
ases that may manifest through this discretion, and inevitable technological 
changes. Creating an accessible, zero-submergence collection furthers the sys-
temic values of predictability and legitimacy by making all data points available 
to the public in one comprehensive body of case law. The technology animating 
the published/unpublished caste system has changed, and so should the system 
itself. The many doctrinal species of precedent will endure,261 sorting the rele-
vant from the irrelevant, horizontal from the vertical, and persuasive from the 
mandatory—along theoretical lines, unimpeded by slippery logistics and opaque 
judicial preferences.  
For all its virtues, however, zero submergence is not inherently costless. This 
is especially true if zero submergence is achieved through the over-inclusive 
route of making every decision available, regardless of reasoning. Concerns lin-
ger that zero submergence may erode any efficiency gained from enhanced pre-
dictability and may induce paralysis—both for researchers analyzing precedent 
and courts deciding issues.262 The next section addresses those concerns and con-
siders some ways to better manage a non-zero level of submergence. 
C. Some Submergence 
To strike the perfect balance of quality and quantity in the body of precedent, 
the ideal percentage of submerged precedent may be above zero. Technology 
already has made decisions more widely and readily available. But this democ-
ratization of information also runs the risk of drowning out the signal of the law 
with the noise of individual decisions,263 as well as possibly deterring courts from 
writing out their reasoning at all.  
Throughout the technological evolution of access to decisional law, we have 
accepted the premise that some reasoned decisions are not suitable to be included 
                                                        
(explaining collection policies circa 2007 and noting that “Lexis and Westlaw representatives 
reported no substantial differences in how the two services obtain content”). 
261  See supra Part II.A.2. 
262  See Pether, supra note 14, at 1445–47; Price, supra note 173, at 110. 
263  See MacLachlan, supra note 37, at 616. 
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in precedent. The ratio of exclusion we are willing to accept and the mechanism 
for where to draw the line has shifted outward with each innovation.264 The ques-
tion posed by this project is who should make the initial cut: the authoring judge, 
docket clerks, Westlaw editors, or individual researchers (future courts, litigants, 
and analysts) on an as-necessary basis.  
The erosion of predictability and legitimacy implicated by submergence of 
some precedents may be offset to some degree by enhanced efficiency.265 If 
fewer decisions are available, then parties and future judges expend less effort 
wading through them to find relevant and persuasive precedents. Of course, if 
that initial selection for availability is skewed, then parties’ predictions will be 
inaccurate, producing inefficiency.266 Wholesale importation of reasoned deci-
sions into the pool of available precedents will overcome skew, but create more 
work for those researching precedents by increasing the volume of potential prec-
edent without sifting for quality.  
Or we could keep some precedents submerged on dockets but include dock-
ets in a new standard for competent research by lawyers.267 Parties to litigation 
already might consider a targeted search for submerged precedents if there are 
no other cases available to aid their predictive efforts. And, of course, once a 
judge is assigned to the case, it makes sense to search that judge’s own opinions 
to get predictive information on that decision-maker’s precedent and reasoning. 
But requiring parties to sift through submerged precedent in the normal course 
of research is not practical or efficient with the current state of technology. 
                                                        
264  In the English system we inherited, the ratio heavily favors exclusion because judges usu-
ally speak, rather than write, their decisions and reasoning. See generally Healy, supra note 
145 (summarizing evolution of the precedent system in England, the American colonies, and 
in the post-Revolutionary War period). This system represents the smallest volume of written 
precedent and the highest degree of discretion over what decisions become part of precedent. 
In the earlier years of the United States, the physical limitations of print, the lower workload 
of the judiciary, and the geographic expanses of our jurisdictions contributed to acceptance of 
the Reporter system and its degree of discretion in selecting the opinions that would be made 
available. See generally Price, supra note 173 (tracing the precedential system after the found-
ing of the United States). With database technology in the 1980s and internet delivery in the 
late 1990s, our written precedent shed the physical limitations of print. Database technology 
could hold much more and could adapt more quickly to new information, which was good 
timing because the federal courts’ workload was increasing, too. Just as in the print Reporter 
days, judges exercised discretion to include opinions in the database, and the database editors 
exercised discretion whether to include opinions not selected by judges. See generally Martin, 
supra note 210, at 9. Thus, as the volume of opinions increased, the discretionary power judges 
had over determining available precedent decreased (shared with database editors—and all 
available on PACER). 
265  See, e.g., Lizotte, supra note 25, at 120. 
266  See Mills, supra note 201, at 446. 
267  Cf. McCuskey, supra note 5, at 441 & n.273 (“Commercial database research in Westlaw 
or Lexis has become not only de rigueur, but also required to establish professional compe-
tence and avoid Rule 11 sanctions.”). 
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The fact that the submerged precedents identified in this project are district 
court decisions raises arguments for and against maintaining some submergence. 
On the one hand, because district court opinions offer non-binding horizontal 
precedent, it becomes even more important to eliminate the potential noise cre-
ated by having too many non-binding opinions in the pool of possible precedents. 
This suggests that maintaining a thoughtfully-curated level of submergence 
might be desirable. On the other hand, because district court opinions do not 
formally bind other courts in the vertical hierarchy, some wider variety in the 
opinions available does not cloud the law for other courts. This suggests that zero 
submergence would be relatively harmless.  
To inch toward that aspirational balance of efficiency and fairness, perhaps 
not every elaborated decision needs to be available on Westlaw. It is possible 
that too much information in the form of too many available decisions could 
create noise or undesirable skew in the law’s development. Submerged prece-
dent’s ideal role in the precedent system thus must account for efficiency, pre-
dictability, and legitimacy.268  
Thinking about an ideal role for submerged precedent requires consideration 
of the costs and benefits of written opinions generally. The considerations in 
whether to write at all are relevant to the appropriateness of submerging prece-
dent once written. If the judge has exercised the discretion to write, we may not 
want to discourage that decision.269 So submerging precedent may be more ap-
propriate or desirable to accommodate the factors underlying the exercise of dis-
cretion. Or, at much greater effort, we could require judges to offer reasoned 
elaboration with every written decision and publicize them all. But unstable fed-
eral court budgets270 and increasing workloads271 may make judicial efficiency 
even more urgent in the near term. Instead, management and administrative in-
novations like the Northern District of Illinois’s order form may be encouraged 
to promote the speedy and inexpensive system to resolve disputes.272 
The creation of a publication panel within each district or circuit could offset 
some of the submergence problems with authoring judges’ prospective classifi-
cation in the current system. This could be achieved informally by action of the 
                                                        
268  See supra Part II.A. 
269  See Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1290. 
270  See Judith Resnick, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1824–25 (2014) (highlighting 
the federal courts’ prioritization of budgetary pressures starting in 2010). Cf. Fiscal Year 2014 
Funding for the Judiciary, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Understand-
ingtheFederalCourts/AdministrativeOffice/DirectorAnnualReport/annual-report-2014/fund-
ing-budget.aspx [https://perma.cc/9NQD-JAMH] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (referencing cuts 
and emergency measures implemented in 2013 and 2014, while acknowledging that the 2015 
budget returns to adequate funding levels). 
271  See Judicial Caseload Indicators: Judicial Business 2014, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscou 
rts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2014/judicial-caseload-indicators.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7KHY-5QRJ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
272  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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district’s chief judge or formally by promulgating a local rule or internal operat-
ing procedure.273 A publication panel could be tasked with periodically sorting 
through the opinions that remain submerged on dockets and selecting those that 
should be promoted to the commercial databases. This task retains some trou-
bling amount of discretion and prospective selection of precedent, but potentially 
removes biases from the opinions’ authors and the parties involved. Any publi-
cation panel should draw membership from the judiciary, practitioners, scholars, 
and citizens beyond those roles to more fully serve the precedent system’s range 
of constituents.274  
Rather than simply exposing existing putative precedents using technology, 
we could also consider ways to encourage courts to generate more of the “written 
opinions” that contribute to development of precedent. To expand the whole ice-
berg, in this metaphor, would have its benefits and costs too. 
Procedural and pragmatic pressures can subtly or unsubtly guide the decision 
whether to write, as well as whether to make writing publicly available. The most 
settled factors in exercising discretion to write include time, the nature of the 
case, procedural rules or customs directing exercise of discretion likelihood of 
appeal, and the court’s institutional role.275  
The time invested in writing a reasoned elaboration can be offset by the re-
turn on that investment. Writing consumes judicial time and energy that might 
more efficiently be allocated to other functions,276 especially in the modern era 
of ever more thinly-stretched judicial resources.277 Submergence, like unpubli-
cation, could represent a modification of custom to deal with docket pressure—
                                                        
273  See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)–(b) (2012) (Rules Enabling Act); FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (district court 
local civil rules); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (district court local criminal rules). And, of course, any 
such rules would themselves have to be “published” on the court website under Section 205 
of the E-Government Act. See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 
116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
274  See Pether, supra note 14, at 1535 (offering British and Australian models for such a del-
egation). 
275  See Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1291–92; cf. Pether, supra note 14, at 1445 (questioning 
the “dominant contemporary justification for unpublication” as workload issues and arguing 
that systematic bias against pro se prisoner post-conviction claims instead drives the appellate 
courts’ unpublication practices). See generally Boyd, supra note 19. 
276  Even if the time and energy are expended by judicial law clerks rather than judges them-
selves, these law clerks could also devote their time to supporting other judicial functions. See 
Richard A. Posner, Foreword, A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 61 (2005) (highlight-
ing the role of law clerks in ghostwriting appellate court opinions); Oldfather, supra note 9, at 
1344 (“[I]t is rarely the case that [federal] judges . . . are the initial authors of the opinions that 
go out under their names.”). 
277  Federal civil filings increased 2 percent in 2013 and 6.3 percent over the past nine years. 
Compare U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2013, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscou 
rts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx [https://perma.cc/75R8-YDJ 
A] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016), with Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2013, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/caseload-statistics-
2013/caseload-summary.aspx [https://perma.cc/4JLY-ELWP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). The 
increase has been even more dramatic in the past 25 years. See Caseload Increases Stress Need 
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allowing the judge to devote some time to writing a reasoned explanation, but 
relieving her of the burden to perfect and otherwise ready that writing for broader 
public consumption. The judge might see reasons to exercise her discretion and 
write. But she may view the writing as useful only to the parties involved or place 
greater weight on the need for speed than thoroughness and elegance.278 In those 
instances where submergence of written opinions results from efficiency consid-
erations, bringing those opinions to the surface theoretically could deter the ini-
tial decision to write, thus depriving the parties and posterity of reasoned elabo-
ration and its benefits.  
The nature of the case can vary the return on investment for trial courts de-
ciding to write opinions. Complex cases may require more effort to decide and 
writing can sharpen that analysis.279 Complex cases or highly-contested issues 
also may require writing to effectively communicate the decision to the loser.280 
Similarly, decisions on unsettled and/or dispositive issues may warrant writing 
to communicate to the appellate court when appellate review seems likely. Sub-
mergence largely prevents these communications from reaching a wider audi-
ence. If the possibility of public consumption would deter courts’ communica-
tion to the parties and appellate reviewers, then we might lose this important 
communicative function. 
But deterrence presupposes discretion. And rules can constrain discretion.281 
Procedural rules or customs directing written opinions ensure that courts com-
                                                        
for New Federal Judgeships, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 10, 2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/caseload-
increases-stress-need-new-federal-judgeships [https://perma.cc/CNL5-KQ6E] (advocating 
for creation of more judgeships because “filings have risen 39 percent in federal district courts, 
and 34 percent in the courts of appeals” since 1990). See generally Oldfather, supra note 9, at 
1288. 
278  For example, a district court granted a motion for leave to amend the complaint using a 
concise, but reasoned “Memorandum Opinion” in Womack v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., No. 
3:06-cv-00285-D (N.D. Tex. July 14, 2006), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-
txnd-3_06-cv-00285/pdf/USCOURTS-txnd-3_06-cv-00285-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/42TR-
8NAS]. In its elaboration, the court construes federal and state rules of procedure, identifies a 
lingering ambiguity in an Erie question, cites Wright & Miller, and three of its own prior 
opinions. Id. Yet the author notes initially: 
Under § 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002 and the definition of “written opinion” 
adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, this is a “written opinion[ ] issued by the 
court” because it “sets forth a reasoned explanation for [the] court’s decision.” It has been written, 
however, primarily for the parties, to decide issues presented in this case, and not for publication 
in an official reporter, and should be understood accordingly. 
Id. at 1 n.1. While tagged “written opinion” under the statutory directive, the opinion is not 
available in Westlaw. 
279  Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1291. 
280  Id. But see generally Gertner, supra note 165 (describing how focus on explanations for 
losers at the summary judgment stage may skew development of precedent). 
281  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); cf. 
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–80, 590–93 
(1988). 
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municate at a minimum with parties and appellate reviewers in particular deci-
sions.282 Where rules have supplanted discretion with direction to write, sub-
mergence of those compelled writings may restore some of the authoring court’s 
discretion over how her reasoning is deployed. This would ring especially true 
where writing rules are explicitly aimed at communication with parties and ap-
pellate reviewers.283 This, in fact, may be why the Rule 56(a) amendment pre-
served district courts’ discretion over the “form and detail” of the required state-
ment of reasons in the summary judgment context,284 after eroding their 
discretion over whether to offer reasons. 
Trial courts’ position as courts on the front lines of civil litigation can en-
courage writing to serve institutional functions beyond simply communicating 
with those the decision directly impacted.285 As explained above in Part II, trial 
judges may not have the power to bind vertically with their opinions, but the 
volume of novel issues they decide without appellate review contributes mightily 
to the development of the law. Under their original jurisdiction, trial courts see 
new issues and circumstances first, giving them the opportunity to develop tem-
plates for future courts and parties facing similar issues or circumstances.286  
Analyzing this slice of submerged precedent bolsters Chad Oldfather’s con-
clusion that judicial discretion, as a standard for determining whether to write a 
reasoned elaboration, works at the district-court level.287 For all the reasons that 
standards may be preferred over rules generally,288 and specifically in the context 
of Rule 1’s announced purposes,289 the decision whether to write should remain 
largely within the trial court’s discretion for the foreseeable future.  
While judicial discretion determines whether a judge will offer reasoned ex-
planations,290 procedural exceptions can alter this discretion by requiring or sug-
gesting writing in particular circumstances. For example, the 2010 Amendments 
                                                        
282  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (requiring recorded reasoning for summary judgment mo-
tion decisions). 
283  E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) advisory committee’s notes to 2010 Amendment (explaining 
that a statement of reasons may “facilitate an appeal” and that “identification of central issues 
may help the parties to focus further proceedings”). 
284  Id. 
285  Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 
59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 584 (2009) (“[D]istrict court judges are on the front line of applying 
the standards on 12(b)(6) motions.”); Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1291 (“By virtue of being on 
the legal system’s ‘front lines,’ trial judges enjoy a perspective that appellate judges do not.”); 
see also Levin, supra note 56, at 977–80 (arguing that this is why district court opinions mat-
ter). 
286  Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1291–92. 
287  See id. at 1342 (concluding that his “analysis validates the largely discretionary scheme of 
current standards relating to judicial writing”). 
288  See generally McCuskey, supra note 8 (summarizing the rules-versus-standards debate). 
289  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (articulating procedural rules’ goals of “just, speedy, and inexpensive” 
resolution of disputes). 
290  Oldfather, supra note 9, at 1289. 
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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 added a direction that district court judges 
“should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.”291 
The Committee Notes to the amendment highlight some advantages for record-
ing reasons in the summary judgment context, including that “a statement of rea-
sons can facilitate an appeal or subsequent trial-court proceedings.”292 While em-
phasizing that reasons for granting the dispositive motion are “particularly 
important,” the Committee noted that “[t]he statement on denying summary 
judgment need not address every available reason.”293 The Committee’s direc-
tion left “[t]he form and detail of the statement” to the court’s discretion.294  
Summary judgment is the lone dispositive motion suggesting recorded rea-
soned elaboration,295 but a handful of other decisions do direct the exercise of 
discretion toward reasoning.296 To generate a more useful body of decisional law 
on the jurisdiction question, we could consider the effect of making a modifica-
tion to the removal statute directing remand orders be accompanied by explana-
tion—like Rule 11 (required) or 56 (suggested). While this would erode some of 
the efficiency gained from making remand orders unappealable, it could help 
correct the imbalance in the precedent that has evolved from that insulation. 
Short of structural change to procedure, judicial education on opinion writ-
ing and docketing offers another promising avenue for buoying some submerged 
precedent into the world of visible law. On the generation of precedent, guidance 
from the Federal Judicial Center, District Chief Judges, and the Circuit Courts 
could directly suggest that district judges more often use their discretion to write 
reasoned elaborations on topics particularly important at the trial-court level, like 
jurisdictional remands.297 On the court’s role in accessibility of precedent, the 
Administrative Office and district administrators could offer some targeted train-
ing on best practices for disseminating opinions, as well as conduct periodic sur-
veys of each court’s docketed opinions and orders to monitor submergence.298 
                                                        
291  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) advisory committee’s notes to 2010 Amendment (explaining the 
amendment “adds a new direction that the court should state on the record the reasons for 
granting or denying the motion”). 
292  Id. 
293  Id. (emphasis added). 
294  Id. 
295  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (containing no direction on reasoning for motions to dismiss or for 
judgment on the pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (motion for judgment as a matter of law); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law). 
296  See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(c)(1) (requiring a conditional ruling on a motion for a new trial 
accompanying a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, and further requiring that 
the court “must state the grounds for conditionally granting or denying the motion for a new 
trial,” but not imposing a similar requirement for the motion for judgment). 
297  See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 152, at 7. 
298  See e.g., Administrative Oversight and Accountability, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/judicial-administration/administrative-over-
sight-and-accountability [https://perma.cc/23D5-QRG9] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (“The Fed-
eral Judicial Center (FJC) and the AO offer in-person and web-based training for chief judges 
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Judicial education, of course, is neither impervious to bias nor without contro-
versy.299 But by targeting opinion dissemination at its source, judicial training 
could at the very least correct the unintentional submergence of opinions. 
If we want some discretion in our available precedents to encourage judicial 
writing and to spare us from the burden of complete access, then we should 
thoughtfully navigate the procedural and pragmatic pressures on precedent’s cre-
ation, as well as its submergence. A more conscious evolution of technology in 
recognition of doctrinal goals is in order at this moment. 
CONCLUSION 
At last, we have reached a level of technological sophistication that offers us 
the opportunity to build a body of decisional law reflective of precedent doc-
trine’s amiable goals: fairness, legitimacy, and efficient, stable development of 
the law. We should seize this opportunity to conscientiously navigate a course to 
full, meaningful access to court decisions. 
The existence of submerged precedent threatens to skew development of the 
law and disrupt the reliability and legitimacy of our precedential system. Yet 
ignorance to the existence of submerged precedent poses a more immediate 
threat. Identifying and acknowledging submerged precedent offers the first coun-
terweight to the phenomenon itself. As of this writing—and your reading—sub-
merged precedent is now a known unknown, which should inform the calcula-
tions courts, litigants, and lawyers make daily.  
Two other counterweights may deter submerged precedent’s threat. First, 
submerged precedent may encourage written reasoning for individual parties, 
even if not presented for posterity. And that is good. Explaining the reasons for 
a decision may increase parties’ satisfaction with the legal process resolving their 
disputes and bolsters the rule of law. By encouraging explanation for the parties, 
submerged precedent may be better than no precedent at all on measures of fair-
ness and legitimacy. The layers of discretion directing some opinions to public 
consumption and others to submergence may help isolate the signal of the law 
from the noise of context-specific decisions.  
The question remains whether submerged precedent or no precedent would 
be more harmful to development of decisional law. Unexplained decisions may 
                                                        
and unit executives on their management and oversight responsibilities. In addition, the Di-
rector of the AO has a statutory duty to ‘supervise all administrative matters’ in the courts.”). 
299  See Suja A. Thomas, Opinion, Via Duke, Companies Are Shaping Discovery, 
LAW360.COM (Nov. 4, 2015, 2:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/723092/opinion-
via-duke-companies-are-shaping-discovery-rules [https://perma.cc/AMK3-WLBR] (high-
lighting the role that private companies play in developing “guidelines” on Rule 26 propor-
tionality and the role those “guidelines” play in judicial education on the new discovery rules). 
See generally S.I. Strong, Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture: Does the Current Sys-
tem of Educating Judges Promote a Well-Functioning Judiciary and Adequately Serve the 
Public Interest?, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2015) (surveying and critiquing the evolution of pri-
vate influence on judicial education programs). 
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stunt the development of law, while submerged precedent may skew it. Addi-
tionally, submerged precedent may contribute to the phenomenon of private 
judging that can further disadvantage already-disadvantaged parties, while heap-
ing additional strategic advantage on well-funded institutional litigants.  
As technology and effort evolve and democratize the availability of all court 
decisions, the isolation of the law from an ever-increasing number of individual 
decisions may become increasingly complex. But the identification of sub-
merged precedent and the careful consideration of systemic values behind our 
system of decisional law can help guide that evolution.  
The application of precedent theory informed by empirical observation pre-
sented here suggests that the time has come for technology to return us to prece-
dent’s doctrinal foundations—to make all court opinions accessible as a body of 
law and let time determine which opinions are destined to become precedent and 
which decide but one case.  
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APPENDIX 1 – OMNICARE, INC. V. WALGREENS 
08-cv-03901 (Dkt. 31) (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2008) 
Name of Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge: Matthew F. Kennelly 
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT 
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants plaintiff’s motion to remand 
[docket no. 17]. The Clerk is directed to remand the case to the Circuit Court of 
Cook County, Illinois. 
STATEMENT 
In May 2007, Omnicare, Inc. sued Walgreens Health Initiatives, Inc. (WHI) 
in Illinois state court for breach of contract. Omnicare alleged WHI had breached 
a contract between the two entities relating to the provision of pharmaceutical 
products and services to participants in Medicare Part D. In December 2007, the 
state court granted United Healthcare Services, Inc. (UHS) and Comprehensive 
Health Management, Inc. (CHM) leave to intervene as defendants, on the ground 
that WHI had contracted with Omnicare on their behalf and that they might be 
liable if Omnicare prevailed. In May 2008, the state court denied defendants’ 
motion to dismiss Omnicare’s complaint and gave Omnicare leave to file an 
amended complaint. Omnicare did so on June 11, 2008, asserting claims against 
WHI, UHS, and CHM. CHM then removed the case to this Court, with UHS and 
WHI both consenting in writing to the removal. The removal was based on 
CHM’s contention that one of Omnicare’s claims included allegations that the 
defendants had breached the contract by failing to comply with various require-
ments of federal law. 
Omnicare has moved to remand the case to state court. It makes several ar-
guments in support of removal, but the Court need address only one of them. 
Omnicare argues that in the contract, the defendants gave up the right to remove 
the case. It relies on a contractual provision that reads as follows: 
Governing Law. This Agreement will be construed and governed according to the 
laws of the State of Illinois. The courts of the State of Illinois shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the parties with respect to any dispute or controversy between 
them arising under or in connection with this Agreement and, by execution and 
delivery of this Agreement, each of the parties to this Agreement submits to the 
jurisdiction of those courts, including the in personam and subject matter jurisdic-
tion of those courts, waives any objection to such jurisdiction on the grounds of 
venue or forum non conveniens, the absence of in personam or subject matter 
jurisdiction and any similar grounds, consents to service of process by mail or any 
other manner permitted by law, and irrevocably agrees to be bound by any judg-
ment rendered thereby in connection with this Agreement. These consents to ju-
risdiction shall not be deemed to confer rights on any person other than the parties 
to this Agreement. 
Compl., Ex. 1 ¶ 7.4. 
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CHM, joined by WHI, opposes removal. CHM’s first argument is that be-
cause the contract was between Omnicare and WHI, the quoted provision does 
not bind CHM. The Court disagrees; CHM was granted leave to intervene in state 
court based on its representation that in entering into the agreement, WHI was 
contracting with Omnicare on CHM’s behalf. It thus effectively conceded that 
the contract was executed by a party acting as its agent, making the provision 
equally binding on CHM. Cf. Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard 
S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1999) (non-party to contract providing for 
dispute resolution via arbitration may be bound by arbitration requirement via 
principles of agency law); Fyrnetics (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Quantum Group, Inc., 
293 F.3d 1023, 1029 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Am. Bureau of Shipping with ap-
proval). But even were the agreement’s forum selection provision not binding on 
CHM, that would not prevent remand. WHI is unquestionably bound by the 
agreement. For that reason, if the forum selection provision prevents removal of 
the case to federal court, WHI was contractually barred from joining in the re-
moval. “A petition for removal fails unless all defendants join it,” Roe v. 
O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Mur-
phy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999), and thus if 
WHI could not properly join in the removal, the case could not properly be re-
moved. 
The Court therefore turns to the issue of whether the provision precludes 
removal of the case. A forum selection provision may amount to a waiver of a 
party’s right to remove a case to federal court, but to do so the waiver must be 
clear and unequivocal. See, e.g., Oberweis Dairy, Inc. v. Maplehurst Farms, Inc., 
No. 88 C 4857, 1989 WL 2078, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1989). This provision 
meets that requirement. Though it carries the title “Governing Law,” the provi-
sion clearly states that the contracting parties submit to the subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction of “[t]he courts of the State of Illinois” and waive any ob-
jection to venue in those courts. It thus amounts to both a selection of both juris-
diction and venue, unlike certain of the cases cited by CHM in which there was 
a consent to the former but not the latter. 
The Court rejects CHM’s argument that the provision is ambiguous and thus 
must be construed as something other than a waiver. The title to the provision 
does not make it ambiguous; the text clearly and unequivocally includes provi-
sions beyond the “governing law.” Nor does the absence of a specific statement 
that the right of removal is forfeited render the clause ambiguous; the fact that a 
contractual provision arguably could have been drafted with greater specificity 
does not make it ambiguous. As long as there is language indicating the parties’ 
intent to make venue exclusive – which there is in this case – a forum selection 
provision of this type is enforced and requires that venue be situated in the chosen 
jurisdiction. See Muzumdar v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759, 762 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
The Court also rejects CHM’s argument that the clause is broad enough to 
permit venue to be situated in a federal court in Illinois. That is not how the 
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provision reads. It says that disputes must be litigated in the “courts of the State 
of Illinois.” A federal court is not a “court of the State of Illinois.” See, e.g., 
Amer. Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., 428 F.3d 921, 925-26 
(10th Cir. 2005) (provision requiring disputes to be determined in “courts of the 
State of Colorado” did not permit removal of case to federal court in Colorado). 
Were the provision worded differently – for example – to provide that disputes 
are to be litigated in a “court in Illinois,” CHM might have the better of the ar-
gument, but the Court can neither rewrite the contract nor twist its meaning to 
permit the dispute to be litigated in federal court. 
Finally, the Court rejects CHM’s argument that the forum selection provi-
sion is unenforceable. A forum selection clause is enforceable unless the party 
opposing enforcement shows that it would be unreasonable or unjust to enforce 
the provision or that it is invalid, for example due to fraud or overreaching. See 
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). CHM has made no 
such showing. Its only argument against enforceability amounts to a contention 
that if adjudication of a claim turns on interpretation of federal law, it cannot get 
a fair hearing in state court. See CHM Resp. at 4. CHM cites no authority, how-
ever (nor is the Court aware of any), for the proposition that forum selection 
clauses requiring cases to be venued in state court are unenforceable in suits in-
volving federal questions. 
For these reasons, the Court grants plaintiff’s motion to remand [docket no. 
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APPENDIX 2 – WETLANDS BOARD V. WARE 
4:08-cv-00107 (Dkt. 45) (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2009) 
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER300 
This matter is before the Court on Wetlands Board of the County of James 
City and The County of James City's ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Remand. Having 
carefully reviewed the parties' pleadings, the Court finds this matter ripe for ju-
dicial determination. For the reasons below Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand is 
GRANTED. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This action arises out of alleged violations of state and local environmental 
laws as a result of Defendant's maintenance of a road located on his property. 
Defendant owns property in James City County identified as 5004 River Drive, 
Lanexa, Virginia (the "Property"), a portion of which is designated as jurisdic-
tional wetlands. The County of James City (the "County"), political subdivision 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, adopted a wetlands ordinance and created the 
Wetlands Board of James City County (the "Board") to enforce its ordinance. 
As a result of litigation initiated by Plaintiffs in 1993, Docket No. 4:93cv l 
5, Defendant and the Property were subject to a Final Order entered by this Court 
on July 28, 1995 (the "1995 Order"), which declared that Defendant was in vio-
lation of the Federal Clean Water Act, the Virginia Wetlands Act, the County's 
Erosion and Sedimentation Control Ordinance, and the County’s Wetlands Or-
dinance. (Final Ord. at 4. (Doc # 27)). The 1995 Order found a portion of De-
fendant’s property to be jurisdictional wetlands, ordered Defendant to remove all 
fill and restore the wetlands, and allowed Defendant to recreate a road through 
the wetlands to access the Chickahominy River. (Id at 6-8). The Order also re-
quired that a monitoring plan be placed in effect and expressly stated that moni-
toring was not to exceed the date of November 1, 1997. (Id. at 8). 
In January 2008, Plaintiffs filed a show cause petition in the Circuit Court of 
James City County (the "Circuit Court") seeking to enforce the Court's 1995 Or-
der. In response to Plaintiff s petition, the Circuit Court declined to exercise ju-
risdiction, finding that the matter would be more appropriately decided in the 
court where the Final Order originated. On January 11, 2008, Defendant filed a 
motion, in federal court, for relief from judgment and the Final Order. Plaintiffs 
subsequently filed a motion to show cause, asking this Court to require Defend-
ant to show why he should not be held in contempt for expanding his road in 
excess of the width they claimed was specified in the 1995 Order. The Court held 
a hearing on the motions on March 10, 2008, and on March 24, 2008, this Court 
found that Defendant satisfactorily completed the rehabilitation required by the 
                                                        
300  Five footnotes omitted. 
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1995 Order. (March 24, 2008 Order at 2. (Doc. # 61)). The Court also found that 
the 1995 Order "no longer applie[d] to Defendant's property, and this Court no 
longer ha[d] jurisdiction over Defendant's use of his property." (Id.). 
On October 24, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a Petition in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Williamsburg and County of James City, this time seeking to enforce a 
Restoration Order issued by the Board. Count I of Plaintiffs' Petition alleges that 
officers of the Wetlands Board and the Chesapeake Bay Board observed wet-
lands violations on Defendant's property. The Petition offers details of the 
Board's procedure of holding a hearing regarding the alleged violations on the 
Property and the Board's issuance of a notice to comply to Defendant. Finally, 
Count I alleges that Defendant failed to submit an acceptable restoration plan, 
despite such request, and the Board, adopting the County's proposed restoration 
plan, issued a Restoration Order requesting Defendant's compliance. It is this 
Restoration Order and, as a result, the alleged violations of the Virginia Wetlands 
Act, that Plaintiffs seek to enforce in the instant Petition. 
On October 30, 2008, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 based upon federal question jurisdiction. On December 2, 2008, 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand and Brief in Support. Defendant filed his 
Opposition Brief on December 12, 2008, and Plaintiffs filed their Reply Brief on 
December 29, 2008. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 144 l (a) (2000), a defendant may remove to federal court 
"any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction. " However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), "[i]f at 
any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." Where, as here, jurisdiction is as-
serted by a defendant in a removal petition, the defendant has the burden of es-
tablishing that removal is proper. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. 
Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit has held that removal jurisdiction is to be strictly 
construed in light of federalism concerns. See Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 440 
(4th Cir. 2005). 
The only possible ground for federal jurisdiction in the instant case is federal 
question jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts are vested 
with original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States." Generally, a claim "arises under" federal 
law only if a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff s complaint. 
Otherwise, removal is lacking even if the defendant asserts a defense based ex-
clusively on federal law. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 286, 392 (1987). 
("The party who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon."); 
see also Franchise Tax Bd v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 
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(1983) ("[A] defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plain-
tiffs complaint establishes that the case 'arises under' federal law."). In order to 
remove a case under federal question jurisdiction, the federal question "must be 
an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff s cause of action." Lontz, 413 
F.3d at 439 (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936)). 
In cases where federal law creates the plaintiff s cause of action, federal 
courts "unquestionably" have subject matter jurisdiction. Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 
151. If, however, state law creates the cause of action, the court must determine 
whether the adjudication of those state law claims "requires resolution of a sub-
stantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13. The "mere 
presence" of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically con-
fer federal-question jurisdiction. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 
U.S. 804, 813 (l986). After examining only those allegations which are properly 
raised in a well-pleaded complaint, a court must then determine whether the sub-
stance of those actions raises a federal question. West 14th St. Comm'l Corp. v. 5 
W 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 1986). If the claim arises under 
federal law, the federal court will re-characterize it and uphold removal. Feder-
ated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 294, 298 n.2 (1981). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs urge the Court to remand the instant action to state court because 
their Petition only seeks enforcement of a Restoration Order issued by the Board 
pursuant to state and local environmental laws. Further, Plaintiffs represent to 
this Court that they did not assert any federal causes of action in the petition and 
have no intention of pursuing any within the confines of this civil action. De-
fendant counters that his removal of this action is proper, arguing that the express 
allegations of the petition establish federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, 
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' right to relief depends on construction of fed-
eral laws, namely the federal injunction issued by this Court in 1995. 
In Count I of their Petition, Plaintiffs attempt to enforce a Restoration Order 
that was issued in response to Defendant's alleged violations of state and local 
wetlands laws. Despite Defendant's assertions, nowhere in Plaintiffs' Petition do 
they allege violations of the Clean Water Act or any other federal law that would 
provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. Instead, Plaintiffs simply assert that cer-
tain state and local wetlands violations were observed on Defendant's property. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant placed "riprap rubble within the ju-
risdictional wetlands and fill[ed] and grad[ed] within the jurisdictional wetlands 
without a permit from the County." (Brief Supp. Mot. Remand 5). Plaintiffs fur-
ther allege that Defendant failed to comply with or appeal their Restoration Or-
der. (Id.). Although Defendant attempts to characterize Plaintiffs' cause of action 
as one arising out of federal law, the Petition does not cite any federal statute, 
nor mention any federal common law cause of action. Applying the well-pleaded 
complaint rule to the case at bar, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Petition does not, 
on its face, reveal a federal question. 
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Defendant also argues that removal jurisdiction exists because any resolu-
tion of Plaintiffs' claim would necessarily deal with this Court's 1995 Order. De-
fendant further supports his "arising under" federal question jurisdiction argu-
ment by claiming that the violations at issue are not based on state law but rather 
concern the twelve foot dimensions allegedly established per the injunction in 
the 1995 Order. Although Defendant is correct in his assertion that a state court 
lacks jurisdiction to enforce a federal injunction, see Baker v. General Motors 
Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998), the federal injunction established by the 1995 Order 
is no longer at issue and is not raised in the Petition currently before the Court. 
Defendant relies on Plaintiffs' reference to the 1995 Order in their Petition 
as sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction, as Defendant claims that Plaintiffs' 
current action seeks to enforce the 1995 Order. However, Plaintiffs' reference to 
the 1995 Order in Paragraphs 19 and 20 of their Petition, as pointed out by De-
fendant, does not serve to state a claim. Rather, those references attempt to dis-
tinguish Plaintiffs' current action regarding Defendant's alleged state and local 
wetlands violations from the previous show cause action concerning Defendant's 
alleged non-compliance with the 1995 Order. 
Moreover, as noted in the March 24, 2008 Order issued by Judge Bradberry, 
"the [1995] Order did not control the road in question . . . [and] it was not the 
Court's intention to . . . dictate the exact dimensions of the road throughout the 
property's existence." (March 24, 2008 Order at 3). Additionally, "the [1995] 
Order was not intended to be a controlling force throughout the life of the owner 
or his property." (Id.). The Court also noted that Defendant fully complied with 
and satisfactorily completed the obligations under the Final Order, whose sole 
purpose was to require rehabilitation of the wetlands. The Court concluded that 
the Final Order was no longer binding and dismissed the matter for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs' Petition in no way attempts to recover through enforcement of the 
1995 Order, under the Clean Water Act or any other federal law. A fair reading 
of the Petition in this case provides no basis for federal question jurisdiction. The 
Court finds that Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that federal 
question jurisdiction exists over this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion to Re-
mand is GRANTED. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand is GRANTED. It is 
ORDERED that this case be, and it hereby is, REMANDED to the Common-
wealth of Virginia, Circuit Court of the City of Williamsburg and County of 
James City pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion 
and Order to counsel of record and Plaintiffs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Raymond A. Jackson 
United States District Judge 
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APPENDIX 3 – COMPARISON OF ONLINE CASE LAW SERVICES 
The table highlights the extent of each service’s collection, as described on 
its website, as well as some of the most advanced search functions. To test the 
limitations of each collection, I searched opinions from January 1, 2006 to De-
cember 31, 2014 for the word “Grable” and phrase “federal question.” I per-
formed the search in all district courts, where available, and in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois as a comparative sample. 
TABLE 2 






PACER written opinions, 




Yes PACER written opinions >1,000303 27 
Google Scholar304 No 
Opinions licensed from an 
unspecified legal vendor305 
1,010306 28 
FDSys307 No PACER written opinions 650308 31 
Fastcase309 Yes 





caselaw” released from 
federal courts312 
101 N/A313 
Findlaw314 No Undefined N/A315 N/A 
Public Library of 
Law316 
No 
Appellate courts only, 
through Fastcase service 
N/A317 N/A 
LII318 No 
PACER written opinions via 




                                                        
301  WESTLAW, supra note 97. 
302  BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberglaw.com/opinion_search [https://perma.cc/7FFQ-
SLV4] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
303  BloombergLaw halts results at 1,000, but indicates that there are “1,000+” results. See id. 
304  GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com [https://perma.cc/TAL9-BQQM] (last vis-
ited Mar. 4, 2016). 
305  See Using Google Scholar for Case Law Research, MD. ST. L. Libr., 
http://www.lawlib.state.md.us/researchtools/googlescholar.html [https://perma.cc/5JDP-
L7V5] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (explaining that the services collects from federal courts 
back to 1923 and gets its content “from a major legal information vendor”). 
306  You can search all federal districts here by selecting all of the federal courts, then unse-
lecting the court of appeals and bankruptcy courts under each circuit. 
307  FDsys, supra note 97. 
308  FDSys is still in pilot stage and does not yet have opinions collected from all the federal 
district courts. 
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309  FASTCASE, http://www.fastcase.com [https://perma.cc/V2HN-KHYD] (last visited Mar. 4, 
2016). 
310  See Scope of Coverage, FASTCASE, http://www.fastcase.com/whatisfastcase/coverage 
[https://perma.cc/ZPV7-UYTS] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
311  LEAGLE, http://www.leagle.com [https://perma.cc/G74F-EP83] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
312  About Leagle, Inc. and Our Content, LEAGLE, http://www.leagle.com/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/24EN-9KDD] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
313  Service does not permit individual jurisdiction searches. 
314  FINDLAW, http://www.findlaw.com [https://perma.cc/6MTQ-EK8L] (last visited Mar. 4, 
2016). 
315  Findlaw.com does not permit text searches or searches across all districts. 
316  PUB. LIBR. L., http://www.plol.org [https://perma.cc/N6Z2-TENC] (last visited Mar. 4, 
2016). Fastcase operates PLOL as a free service. See id. 
317  PLOL does not include district court opinions. To obtain additional results, a user must 
pay for an account with Fastcase. 
318  Federal Law: Judicial Opinions, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/fed-
eral/opinions#other [https://perma.cc/4KZN-LYNS] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
319  Does not permit searching. Merely links to individual courts’ ECF sites. 
